Executive agencies and the public decision-making process: a case study of Kampala Capital City Authority by Kitamirike, Emmanuel
  
 
 
Executive Agencies and the Public Decision-making Process 
A Case Study of Kampala Capital City Authority 
 
Wits School of Governance 
 
 
Emmanuel Kitamirike 
 
 
Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and 
Management, University of the Witwatersrand, in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Management in the 
Field of Public Policy 
 
 
Supervisor 
Prof. Pundy Pillay 
 
 
 
 
April 2017 
ii 
 
DECLARATION  
 
I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirement for the degree of Master of Management in the field of Public Policy at the 
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. It has not been submitted before for any degree 
or examination in any other university. 
 
Emmanuel Kitamirike  
November 2016 
  
iii 
 
DEDICATION 
 
Dedicated to the memory of my late father Mr Inyhensiko James Kanaabi for the belief and 
encouragement bestowed upon me to always aim higher, my wife Ms Jackline Kyozira, my 
daughter Kitamirike Namugosa Daniela and son Kitamirike Daniel for keeping up whenever I 
was away at school.  
  
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT  
Although an individual product, this thesis has been made possible by collective efforts and 
support from several individuals and institutions. First and foremost, I would like to appreciate 
the Board of Directors of the Uganda Youth Network led by Mr Gimara Francis and Mr Matovu 
J. Isa for agreeing to financially support me to undertake the masters‘ programme at the 
University of the Witwatersrand. I recognise and thank my work colleagues both at the Uganda 
Youth Network and the Center for Policy Analysis for their encouragement and back-up 
whenever I was away for academic work.  
I feel indebted to the academic staff at the Wits School of Governance for their professionalism, 
encouragement and indeed inspiration. In particular, I appreciate the efforts of Prof. Susan 
Booysen, who as degree leader, offered considerable academic support and enabled me 
appreciate what a positive decision it was for me to pursue a postgraduate qualification in 
management and public policy. I am equally humbled to be supervised by Prof. Pundy Pillay, an 
academic committed to professionalism and always eager to successfully see me through. I am 
particularly grateful for Prof. Pundy‘s timely acceptance to supervise me in the middle of my 
research pursuits.  
Bravo to the entire non-academic staff at the University of the Witwatersrand particularly the 
academic delivery unit at Wits School of Governance, the central accommodation staff in-charge 
of the Junction and library/computer lab staff at Wits School of Governance – I have been 
immensely supported to make my academic pursuits less cumbersome.  
 
 
  
v 
 
ABSTRACT 
The study examined the legal framework establishing Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) 
as well as actor interactions within the agency policy process, with an ultimate aim of 
ascertaining the extent of public decision-making. The study was structured around three main 
components: an in-depth investigation of the literature on agencification; an application of the 
institutionalism theoretical framework; and an applied case study approach to examine the extent 
and context of policy decision making within KCCA.  
The major finding and indeed central argument is that despite the creation of a central policy-
making role enshrined in the law establishing KCCA, the policy outcomes are not influenced by 
the elected leaders  but rather by the central government and as such, there is limited public 
decision-making. This study has empirically shown that the creation of a matrix agency structure 
with multiple reporting and accountability centres was a symbolic move intended to dupe elected 
leaders with superficial status and authority, but in essence, without any real powers to demand 
policy changes, let alone, be able to sanction bureaucrats for their actions or inaction. The study 
further affirms that bureaucrats managing KCCA affairs, to a great extent, not only play a policy 
implementation function, but also disproportionately influence the shape of policy as a 
consequence of the discretionary powers bestowed upon them by the KCC Act (2010).  The 
paper concludes by highlighting that agencification as one of the new public management (NPM) 
approaches has increased institutional and policy complexities that alienate citizens and citizen 
groups from the decision-making process.  
This reality challenges the existing literature on agencification and New Public Management 
which claims that once we structurally disaggregate and create semi-independent agencies, then 
we see bureaucrats who are more accountable to citizens.   
 
Key Words: agencification, public decision-making, public policy, institutionalism   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Introduction to the Study 
 
This introductory section of the report provides the background and context of the study with an 
illustration of the purpose and literary orientation, towards the research questions and 
propositions. The study explores the new institutional arrangements of the management and 
administration of Kampala following a ‗successful‘ transition from a local government unit to a 
semi-autonomous executive agency with a mandate to deliver public services for and on behalf 
of the central government.  
The study adopted the institutional policy analysis as the analytical frame to appreciate in broad 
terms, the historic events in Uganda‘s public service reform initiatives and specifically, the 
creation of executive agencies to deliver public services on behalf of the central government. The 
paper explores the agencification debate that is pegged on the establishment of agencies at arm's 
length from the main hierarchical spines of ministries, an aspect popularly known as ‗structural 
disaggregation‘. These agencies carry out public tasks and are to a great extent financed, in 
principle at least, by the state budget. The paper traces the agencification debate from the 
successes of the UK‘s Next Program in the 1980s, as well as draws from several countries 
especially in the Commonwealth bloc that adopted agencification as a civil service reform 
initiative that created independent executive agencies with the mandate to increase effectiveness 
and efficiency in the delivery of public goods and services.  
 
Several scholars of agencification and new public management (NPM) have argued in support of 
agencification as the best option to avoid the gradual but sustained decline across the public 
sector witnessed in several countries in the 1970s. The overriding foundation for agencification 
is the managerial autonomy bestowed upon bureaucrats to implement policies that have been 
developed by political actors. The executive agency ―stands at arms‘ length from its parent 
ministry or ministries and carries out public functions, but not (primarily) a commercial 
enterprise‖ (Pollit, Bathgate, Caulfield, Smullen, & Talbot, 2001, p. 271). Finally, the study 
applied in broad sense, the institutionalism theoretical perspective, and in precise terms the 
historical and rational choice institutionalism strands.  
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1.2. Study Terminology  
  
a) Public Decision-Making 
In this study, the use of the term ‗public decision-making‘ is deliberate and informed by two 
dispositions; the first is that when politicians get elected, they do not only serve those who 
elected them, but generally the public, and the decisions that emerge from their actions or 
inaction should ideally be perceived to serve the greater public interest. Second, in making public 
policies, actors are confronted with a multitude of policy solutions that often require ―technical 
and economic rationality, and the necessity for assuring accountability and responsibility of 
decision-making bodies‖ (Renn, Webler, Rakel, Dienel, & Johnson, 1993, p. 189). Borrowing 
from Moynihan (2006, p.1029), public decision-making is the ―active and results-based 
participation of the general citizenry in the public policy processes within their respective 
jurisdictions either directly or through elected representatives‖. For this study, public decision-
making has been analysed through elected representatives.   
b) Agencification 
Agencification, according to Pollitt (2003, P. 2) is ―the creation of non-departmental public 
bodies to deliver services for and on behalf of government‖. In Uganda, these non-departmental 
public bodies have different connotations including authorities, commissions and boards. This 
Study is restricted to the agencification of Kampala City Council (KCC) that resulted in the 
creation of KCCA as an executive agency responsible for the administration and management of 
Kampala city for and on behalf of the central government.  
c) Public Policy 
According to Anderson (2003, p. 2), ―Policy is a relatively stable, purposive course of action 
followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or matter of concern‖. Public 
Policy for this study is delineated as a publicly known course of action(s) formulated by 
Government to address societal challenges.  
d) Institutionalism  
―Institutionalism‖ is the theory underpinning this study and emerges from the term institution 
that denotes a set of rules, procedures and values that influence the way bureaucrats and political 
actors behave. The concept is applied to comprehend the rules, procedures and values that not 
only influenced the agencification of KCCA but also public decision-making in the agency.  
e) Historical Institutionalism  
According to Peters, Pierre, and King (2005, P. 1279), historical institutionalism is a ―theoretical 
branch of institutionalism that explores the rules, procedures and values of an institution through 
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a time-dimension angle identifying the critical stages, ideas and moments that help understand 
the current behaviours of bureaucrats and political actors‖. In this study, historical 
institutionalism is used to explain the stages, ideas and moments that led to the agencification of 
KCC and how this explains the current behaviours of bureaucrats and political actors in the 
public policy processes.  
f) Rational choice institutionalism  
Rational choice institutionalism according to Thoenig (2003, p.129) is a ―branch of 
institutionalism that explores the rules, procedures and values of an institution by looking at the 
effects of institutional reforms‖. This theoretical strand is applied to understand whether the 
agencification of Kampala Capital City was purposely influenced by certain actors who intended 
to reap the benefits of such an institutional reform.  
 
1.3. Statement of the Problem 
 
The agencification process in Uganda and in this case the creation of KCCA has emerged as a 
new non-conventional agency model which combines executive agency principles on the one 
hand, and decentralisation principles on the other. The legal framework (KCC Act, 2010) 
governing the city administration and management retained locally elected leaders with the Lord 
Mayor as the political head of the agency. At the same time, the city is legally governed by the 
central government with a minister as the overall political supervisor. Both the Minister and 
locally elected political leadership have legislative and policy mandates.  
This political and management structure has created significant implications for the institutional 
policy processes, particularly with regard to public policy decision-making. The law thus 
presents a dualistic reporting and accountability structure with the technical wing accountable to 
both the elected political leaders and to the central government through the line ministry (KCC 
Act, 2010). The fundamental question that this study sought to answer was how practical is it to 
have an executive agency with a bureaucracy that reports to two parties – i.e. the line ministry 
and the Authority of elected representatives – and ultimately be able to produce decisions that 
serve the interests of the public? 
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1.4. Purpose of the Study  
 
The purpose of this study is four-fold; first is to comment and generate literature on the 
agencification phenomena in emerging economies with a focus on Uganda and a minimal 
comparative review of the agency model in Tanzania. Tanzania is one of the first countries in the 
region to explicitly enact a legal framework that provides for the establishment of executive 
agencies. Under this interrogation, the study is keen to explore in great depth, the principal-agent 
framework as a point of departure and reflect on Yesilkagit (2004)‘s disposition that ―the 
delegation of formal bureaucratic autonomy to a newly created agency will be affected by the 
organizational culture that evolves within the agency‖.  
 
The second purpose is to apply the historical, contextual and institutional arrangements of the 
new agency model (KCCA) into the theoretical framework of historical and rational choice 
institutionalism.  
 
The third is to undertake a focused analysis regarding public decision making, accountability 
mechanisms and the extent to which elected leaders play central roles in influencing the 
decisions that emerge from executive agencies with dualistic reporting structures.  
 
The fourth and most important is to suggest logical solutions to the agency problem; solutions 
that strengthen citizens‘ voices in the agency public policy-making processes and underpin the 
fundamental principles cherished by proponents of the agencification model – deliver quality 
public services at a lesser cost.  
 
1.5. Research Objectives  
 
The objectives for this study are obtained from the conceptual framework and purpose of the 
study. They are also informed by the theoretical strands applied and need to generate knowledge 
that can improve the agencification processes in emerging economies like Uganda.    
The objectives are to: 
a) analyse the legal regime that established KCCA with a view to finding out the extent to 
which it can enable consensual public decision-making on policy outcomes; 
b) assess the extent to which political leaders (councillors) influence KCCA‘s decision-making 
processes; 
c) examine the extent to which technocrats influence KCCA‘s decision-making processes; and  
d) provide concrete measures to address the challenges (if any) experienced by KCCA‘s 
decision-making processes as a result of its dualistic character. 
 
5 
 
1.6. Primary and Secondary Research Questions 
 
In reference to the purpose and objectives of this study, as well as the need to document both the 
theoretical frameworks and literature on agencification and public decision-making, this study is 
guided by a primary research question and four interrelated secondary research questions as 
follows;  
 
Primary research question 
How are policy decisions arrived at in KCCA which has a dual reporting and accountability 
structure? 
Secondary research questions 
a) To what extent does the law that set up KCCA enhance consensual public decision-making 
on policy outcomes? 
b) To what extent do political leaders (councillors) influence KCCA‘s decision-making 
processes? 
c) To what extent do technocrats influence KCCA‘s decision-making processes?  
d) What needs to be done to address the challenges (if any) resulting from KCCA‘s decision-
making processes, taking into account the agency‘s dualistic character? 
 
1.7. Structure of the Report 
 
The rest of the thesis is structured as follows: Chapter Two provides a review of the literature on 
the academic understanding of agencification, current agency models in broad and specific 
terms, with a careful review of the agency phenomena in Uganda, juxtaposed with the 
agencification processes and form in Tanzania. The chapter also underscores the different agency 
models in terms of mandate, autonomy and practices. Literature is further explored to appreciate 
the concept of public decision-making in executive agencies, and political as well as socio-
economic contextual realities that underpin the cardinal objectives of the study.  
Chapter Three outlines the theoretical and conceptual frameworks that reinforce the study.  It 
rationalises the application of the institutionalism strand and in particular the two strands of 
historical and rational choice institutionalism, before providing a guiding framework that 
supports the analysis of the KCCA institutional arrangements as a consequence of temporal 
processes and the need for agency equilibrium. 
Chapter Four outlines the research design and approach, the methods and techniques applied as 
well as how data was collected and analysed.  
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Chapter Five presents study findings and particularly an analysis of the case study with the aim 
of answering the central research questions laid out in chapter one, and the last chapter concludes 
the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE ON EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 
AND PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING  
2.1. Introduction 
 
This literature review generally explores the main ideas surrounding agencification with a 
precise literary voyage of the notion of public decision-making in an executive agency. The first 
sections cover the academic literature that deal with agencification and public decision-making. 
The survey then traces the origins of the agencification model within the broader context of 
institutional reforms. Thereafter, the agencification policy transfer referred to by Pollit et al 
(2001) as agency fever is explored within Uganda‘s context, with the KCCA agency as a case in 
point. In order to arrive at cross-national perspectives and empirical connections of the 
agencification processes across artificial borders, the review of agencification in Uganda is 
compared with the agencification in Tanzania.  
In totality, the review of the literature has enabled the identification of scholarly ideas applied to 
aid the analysis of how an executive agency is supposed to engage in and with the public 
decision-making processes. 
 
2.2. Agencification  
 
The creation of executive agencies to deliver services for and behalf of government can be traced 
to the Next Steps program in Britain in the late 1980s. The British civil service reform, in turn, 
had the effect of inspiring similar efforts for agencification in other countries in the 
Commonwealth and elsewhere with different connotations such as the Crown entities in New 
Zealand, and independent administrative corporations in Japan, Nakano (2004, p.171). Since 
then, ―the creation of executive agencies has become a common feature of contemporary public 
sector management‖(Sulle, 2010a, p. 345) with Pollit et al., 2001 (p. 271) pronouncing it an 
agency fever.  
Since the 1990s, many emerging economies, including Uganda, followed suit to establish various 
agencies ―driven largely by the pressures to restrain spending and make service to citizens more 
responsive‖(OECD, 2001, p.8). Inherent in the civil service reforms were ―monetary incentives 
in form of development assistance and debt relief by the World Bank and IMF and other 
financial multilateral institutions‖ (Caulfield, 2002b, p. 432), in what popularly came to be 
termed as the structural adjustment programmes  
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What then is agencification? Literature reviewed does not universally agree on an explicit 
definition of agencification. Indeed across all countries that have established agencies, there have 
been variations in agency models especially as regards the autonomy, legal basis and mandate of 
the agencies. These variations have resulted in several explanations mainly based on the different 
categorisations, mandate, autonomy and legal structures.  Scholars of agencification have thus 
used the cross-cutting features to broadly designate what an executive agency is. Pollit, Bathgate, 
Caulfield, Smullen, & Talbot, (2001) in their seminal article Agency fever? Analysis of an 
international policy fashion, offered five distinct characteristics that delineate an executive 
agency as illustrated below;   
Table 1: Characteristics of an Executive Agency 
SN Characteristics Embedded Meaning 
I.  They are at arm's length from the 
main hierarchical spines of ministries  
This implies that an executive agency is 
structurally disaggregated and offered an 
autonomous mandate to implement policies with 
minimal political influence 
II.  Executive agencies carry out public 
tasks (service provision, regulation, 
adjudication, and certification) at a 
national level 
This characteristic distinguishes executive 
agencies from publicly owned and operated for-
profit enterprises  
 
III.  Their core staff are public servants 
(not necessarily civil servants—
definitions here again vary 
enormously between countries) 
 
Most agencies operate under new public 
management systems with staffs contracted to 
deliver specific deliverables and targets in a 
professional and courteous manner.  
IV.  They are financed, in principle at 
least, by the state budget. In practice, 
some agencies recover a good deal of 
their financial needs from charges 
The state bears the bigger responsibility of 
funding the agencies because the  services 
delivered are ideally public in nature 
V.  They are subject to at least some 
administrative law procedures (i.e., 
they are not wholly or predominantly 
private law bodies 
Even in countries like Britain, where agencies 
are not established through a specific legislation, 
the minister lays down administrative 
instruments to guide the operations 
Source: Pollit, Bathgate, Caulfield, Smullen, & Talbot, (2001) 
Caulfield (2002) and Pollitt (2003) assert that the concept of ‗agency autonomy‘ is a central 
feature of the agencification model and that the agency should be outside the hierarchy of the 
line ministry. Two central concepts –‗autonomy‘ and ‗outside a ministerial department‘ - are 
analysed to espouse more on the meaning of agencification. Autonomy of an executive agency is 
in practice either vertical (limited ministerial influence) or horizontal (limited influence of the 
board over policy implementation by the bureaucrats). According to Sulle (2010, p. 347), 
―autonomy is the decision-making competence of an agency, or the extent to which the agency 
can decide for itself matters it finds important for achieving its goals‖. Autonomy then becomes 
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the degree of freedom exercised by an agency in matters of implementing its legal and policy 
mandates.  
Furthermore, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) saw agency 
autonomy as ‗distributed public governance;‘ meant ―to capture the notion of proliferating public 
organisations operating with some degree of separateness from core government ministries‖ 
(Wettenhall, 2005, p. 620). According to Pollitt (2003, p. 2) ―agencification lacks a consistent 
definitional characteristic beyond the idea that agencies should have some autonomy. As a result, 
the meaning of the term can be reconstructed to satisfy policy-makers from countries with 
different motivations and context.‖ Indeed, even within the Next Steps program in the UK, 
significant variations occur with some agencies formally reporting to senior officials and not the 
Minister, while others are involved in ―steering as well as rowing‖ according to Pollit et al 
(2001).  
In light of the above narrative, scholarly reviews point to a set of common features that reinforce 
the meaning of agencification as; public bodies ‗at arm‘s length‘ from the line ministry; have 
some sort of service delivery as a core mandate; have a fully functioning set of bureaucrats 
(public servants); are funded to a great extent from the national budget; and operate under a 
defined legal framework (see Pollit et. al., 2001; Caulfield, 2002; Pollitt, 2003; Caulfield, 2002a; 
Egeberg & Trondal, 2009; Pollit et al., 2001; Wettenhall, 2005); Egeberg & Trondal, 2009). All 
these features are clearly embedded in the new public management doctrines that aim at 
improving ―public services by making public sector organisations much more ‗business like‖ 
(Diefenbach, 2009, p. 892) and bestowing upon agency bureaucrats a degree of managerial 
autonomy to implement policies with clearly defined performance targets.  
To further explore the agencification model, Fjeldstad (2009) as quoted in Sulle (2010), p. 346 
presents the tripod model that sums up the diverse characteristics of agencies into three variants, 
namely; structural disaggregation, managerial autonomy and contractualisation of public sector 
management. Structural disaggregation embodies a specialised unit cut off the mainstream civil 
service and given managerial autonomy over the goals pursued, and programmes implemented. 
Managerial autonomy principally implies that politicians are relegated to policy-making and 
their overdue influence in matters of policy implementation is reduced. Managerial autonomy 
bestows on bureaucrats operational freedom to design their programmes and implement them 
with results as the defining targets. Contractualisation of public sector management implies the 
use of NPM-like principles; staffs are given performance contracts which involves ―replacing 
input-based control with results-based control‖ (Verhoest, 2002, p. 30) with one underlying 
principle- government must do more with less.  
The literature further affirms that agencification is as varied as the many countries that have 
adopted the model. ―Across countries, and even sometimes within individual countries, agencies 
vary so much in terms of their powers and statuses that it is hard to think of many generalizations 
that could possibly fit every member of the species‖ (Yesilkagit, 2004, p. 119). These deviations 
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are informed by contextual realities, agency objectives and degree of emphasis on performance 
management. This study, however, focuses on the Yesilkagit (2004) tripod model by making use 
of the three variables of structural aggregation, managerial autonomy and contractualisation as 
the basis for the analysis of the agencification of KCC. In doing so, the study does not lose sight 
of the interplay of the three variables in the arena of policy-making and implementation, and the 
space of elected leaders in influencing decision-making in the agency.  
2.3. Public Decision-Making 
 
The recent literature is awash with different types of citizen participation in democratic 
processes. For the purpose of this study, two variants of citizen participation have been explored. 
Citizen deliberative and participatory democracy, which are the most popular forms practiced in 
Uganda. Participatory democracy is about the various electoral spaces and opportunities that 
enable citizens to engage in political processes and determine political outcomes. According to 
Gastil (2000, p. 12) ―deliberative variants of the participatory model go a step further and 
encourage regular dialogue among citizens to bring their many voices together in search of an 
elusive moral consensus.‖ In a democratic political environment, it is expected that participatory 
and deliberative variants of democracy should enable public decision-making to build public 
consensus along the public policy continuum.  
Although there is no explicit academic definition of the concept of public decision-making, 
Bishop & Davis (2002, p. 18) state  that public decision-making involves the bureaucrats 
(managers) together with the citizens building consensus on policy issues. In addition, Jones 
(1994, p. 1) states that ―democracy has to do fundamentally with the communication of citizens‘ 
preferences to policy elites and the subsequent matching of public policies to those preferences.‖ 
Essentially, the communication between citizens and elites should give rise to public decision-
making in the public policy processes.  
Public decision-making should therefore and in an ideal political setting constitute part-and-
parcel of the public policy-making cycle. Through the two most popular variants of citizens‘ 
participation, the public, either directly or through elected representatives gets ―concerned with 
how issues and problems come to be defined and constructed and how they are placed on the 
political and policy agenda‖(Parsons & Greenwood, 1996, p. 15).  
Public decision-making in KCCA can only be appreciated by extending the literary lenses into 
the city‘s temporal processes. Previously before being turned into an agency, Kampala city was 
governed as a local government unit with an executive mayor and with the decentralization 
policy in play, the city offered a great deal of deliberative participation ensuring that voices of 
the various actors were heard in the city‘s public policy affairs. Citizens‘ participation in the 
affairs of the city was not only legally and structurally provided but also ensured to enable 
political actors realise the reward of re-election (Gore and Muwanga, 2014, p. 7).  
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In light of the agency model, there is limited scholarly attention to the concept of public 
decision-making, partly because many agency scholars have paid more attention to defining and 
locating the origins of the different agency models as well as locating their place within the NPM 
paradigm. This is despite what Pollit et. al. (2001, p. 277) posit that ―separation into distinct, 
single-purpose organisations will make it easier for key stakeholders to identify, participate in, 
and be consulted about the work of the organisation, i.e., being ‗close to the consumer‘ should 
become easier‖. The agency model such as the KCCA, with an authority of elected 
representatives gives a face-value impression that citizens through delegated authority are fully 
engaging with the policy processes in the agency.  
Certainly, this literary exposition indicates a shortcoming and Rational for more empirical 
studies around the concept of decision-making in the agency model of governance. Literature has 
shown that  citizens‘ participation and indeed public decision-making is ―constrained, complex, 
untidy and generally regarded with a degree of skepticism and ambivalence‖ (Roberts, 2004, p. 
318).  Borrowing from Moynihan (2006, p. 1029), this study conceptually defines public 
decision-making as the ‗active and results-based participation of the general citizenry in the 
public policy processes within their respective jurisdictions either directly or through elected 
representatives‘.  
2.4.  Agencification in Uganda, the case of KCCA 
 
In light of the initial successes registered in Britain under the Next Steps program, agencification 
became a central model in many public service reforms across the world. The Next Steps 
program coincided with a civil service reform initiative in Uganda with similar tenets that 
pointed to the country‘s initial steps towards agencification. According to Olum (2003, p. 6), the 
reform initiative in Uganda had four tenets, namely: ―redefining the role of government; 
rationalising and streamlining government structures; eliminating redundant staff and 
restructuring management systems and incentive structures for improved performance in public 
service delivery‖. These tenets can be sufficiently located in the NPM principles. Indeed, ―… the 
transition from KCC to KCCA can be regarded as a response to the waves of new public 
management doctrines‖ (Karyeija and Kyohairwe, 2012, p. 108), and the agencification of KCC 
was intent on solving the country‘s civil service challenge that was then ―bloated, highly corrupt 
and inefficient. It was incapable of performing basic service delivery or policy implementation 
functions‖(Xu et al., 2006, p. 14).  
Uganda initiated the agencification reform agenda in the early 1990s through legislative 
processes with each agency created through an Act of Parliament. In 2005, government amended 
Article 5 of the 1995 Constitution to provide for Kampala as the capital city of Uganda which 
shall be administered by the Central Government (GoU, 2006). Kampala city had been 
administered under the Local Governments Act (1997) as a district headed by an elected 
Executive Mayor. The constitutional amendments were followed by the tabling and passing of an 
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Act of Parliament titled the Kampala City Council Act (2010), which structurally disaggregated 
KCC from its parent ministry of Local Government and legally established the KCCA as an 
executive agency to administer and manage the affairs of Kampala city for and on behalf of the 
central government. The agency is technically headed by an Executive Director, a public servant 
appointed by the President for a 5 year renewable contract. There are two political actors in the 
agency; the Authority constituted of the Lord Mayor and councillors as well as a Minister for 
Kampala Affairs appointed by the President.  
In relation to the Yesilkagit (2004) tripod model, KCCA conforms to two of the three 
agencification variants of managerial autonomy and contractualisation but is not entirely 
disaggregated from its line ministry at least as provided for in the KCC Act (2010). In addition to 
its conformity to the two variants, the KCCA agency phenomenon integrates some principles and 
practices of decentralisation. The agency further boosts of having a Minister for Kampala 
Affairs, who doubles as the agency political supervisor on one side and an elected Lord Mayor, 
designated by the KCC Act (2010) as the political head of the Authority on the other hand.  
Contrast this with the UK agencies, where the chief executive officers only report to the line 
Minister and are thus shielded from local political manoeuvres. The KCCA agency model is 
therefore exceptional in its intra-political structuring; an aspect that calls for further empirical 
studies on its unique structural disaggregation.  
2.5. A comparative Analysis of Agencification – the case of Tanzania 
 
The Rational for a comparative analysis of Tanzania is informed by the fact that it‘s one of the 
first countries in the region to explicitly enact a law (the Executive Agencies Act No. 30 of 1997) 
that empowers ministers to establish executive agencies. Following the World Bank and IMF 
funded civil service reforms in the late 1980s and early 1990s; Tanzania in similar fashion to 
several other African countries launched a civil service reform programme. The overriding 
objective was in tandem with that of Uganda; achieve a smaller, affordable, well-compensated, 
efficient and effectively performing civil services‖(Caulfield, 2002, p. 213).  As an immediate 
outcome of the civil service reform, Tanzania adopted the agency form of organization with 7 
agencies established in 1999 and by the end of 2007, there were 24 executive agencies scattered 
across several ministries. These agencies have been established through the enactment of a 
special Act, the Executive Agency Act, No 30 of 1997.  
Comparatively, agencification in Tanzania is guided by a single legislation, while in Uganda 
each executive agency is established by a distinct Act of Parliament. By implication, ministers in 
Tanzania have a high degree of political flexibility to institute administrative instruments that 
guide the general operations of the agency as opposed to Uganda‘s case where political oversight 
and managerial autonomy is limited to the specific legislation establishing the agency. 
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Table 2: A comparative analysis of agencies in Uganda and Tanzania  
Uganda Tanzania 
Each Executive agency is established by a 
distinct legislation such as the KCC Act 
(2010) 
The Executive Agencies Act, No 30 of 1997 is 
the overriding legislation that mandates a 
minister to establish an agency 
Strategic management is vested in the hands 
of agency bureaucrats/managers 
Strategic management is vested in the hands of 
the Permanent Secretary  of the parent ministry 
Agency CEO reports to the Minister and for 
KCCA there is a dual reporting structure 
(both to the minister and the Authority) 
Agency CEO reports to the Permanent 
Secretary of the parent ministry 
KCCA has an Authority (constituted of an 
elected Lord Mayor and councillors). The 
Lord Mayor is the political head of KCCA 
All agencies have Ministerial Advisory Boards 
(MABs) chaired by the Permanent Secretary. 
 
According to Sulle (2010, p. 349) ―the creation of agencies in Tanzania has principally met a 
criterion of being ‗away‘ from their parent ministry and therefore the logic of structural 
disaggregation is empirically visible‖. However there is still contestation on the variable of 
managerial autonomy; CEOs in Tanzania answer to their permanent secretaries and not, as is the 
case in Ugandan agencies, to their ministers.  
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
The theoretical framework for this study is the institutionalism theory, which has been applied to 
enable an empirical analysis of policy actors as both objects and historic political players. Within 
the institutionalism theory are three strands; historical, sociological and rational choice 
institutionalism. In light of the focus of this study, it is considered logical to apply the historical 
and rational choice institutionalism because the two strands are much more explicit in explaining 
agency (institution) structure and impact.  
 
3.2. Reasons for Selecting Institutionalism Theory 
 
In light of the analytical framework for this study, it is critical that the theoretical framework to 
be applied has the capability to explain the chronological underlying processes as well as 
conditions in light of the contemporary behaviours of policy actors within the institution. In light 
of the agencification model, political actors are concerned with establishing a state of 
equilibrium, sufficient to rationalise the behaviours of actors within the institution. This calls for 
a theoretical framework that ―conceptualizes institutions both as independent and dependent 
variables: institutions change as a result of human action, and the changes in expectations and 
process that result can exert profound effects on state behaviors‖ (Keohane and Martin, 1995, p. 
46). The study has subsequently chosen the institutionalism theory because of its capability to 
coherently illuminate the emergence of institutions and their effects on policy formulation.  
Institutional policy analysis as earlier espoused is concerned with the functional and structural 
tenets of an agency (organisation) in the context of influences and behaviours of the key actors 
involved in its management. The choice of the institutionalism theory for this study is further 
influenced by the fact that ―reforms leading to the agencification of KCC can be traced from a 
history of poor service delivery and historic tensions between multiple interests deeply involved 
in its governance‖ Gore & Muwanga (2013, p. 6). The study thus applies the historical 
institutionalism strand to explore how previous temporal processes such as historical events, 
interactions and critical junctures influenced the agencification of the city and how this relates to 
the current frame of public decision-making.  
Because historical institutionalism has limitations such as its failure to sufficiently explain 
institutional change, and the interest of comprehending the impact of contemporary actions by 
institutional actors who may not be linked to previous temporal processes, this study adopts a 
second strand of rational choice institutionalism. The Rational choice institutionalism theoretical 
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strand has been referred to as ―more functionalist in terms of explaining contemporary 
institutional behaviours in the context of the effects of the existence of the very institution‖ 
(Thelen, 1999, p. 369). This implies that this strand can be relied upon to explain the 
contemporary behaviours of policy actors by logically analysing the impact of institutions.  
This study defines institutions as sets of rules, which influence, guide and limit the behaviours of 
actors. Institutional reform, on the other hand, is the deliberate attempt to change the set of rules 
that structures interactions within policy networks (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2006, pp. 144-149; see 
also, Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters et. al., 2005; and Thelen, 1999).  
 
3.3. Historical Institutionalism 
 
Historical institutionalists address the big, substantive questions that are inherently of interest to 
broad publics as well as to fellow scholars. To develop explanatory arguments about important 
outcomes or puzzles, historical institutionalists take time seriously, specifying sequences and 
tracing transformations and processes of varying scale and temporality (Pierson, and Skocpal, 
2002).  
Hall and Taylor (1996), two time-honoured historical institutionalists, define historical 
institutionalism as the ―formal and informal procedures, norms and conventions embedded in the 
organisational structure of polity or political economy.‖ The starting point of historical 
institutionalists is two-dimensional, ―a world replete with institutions‖ (Hall & Taylor, 1996a, p. 
954), and ―empirical puzzles that emerge from observed events or comparisons‖ (Thelen, 1999, 
p. 373). The underlying connotation is that existing institutional power undercurrents reign 
supreme in any new institutional reform process, and that our understanding of these reforms 
makes logical sense if observed in a time-dimensional manner. In precise form, historical 
institutionalists are pre-occupied with the fixed concept as well as processes within an institution 
and how these influence policy actors. Consequently, ―institutional arrangements cannot be 
understood in isolation from the political and social setting in which they are embedded‖ 
(Thelen, 1999, p. 384).  
In the case of Uganda, an amendment to the Constitution was approved in 2005 that established 
the legal authority of the central government to ―provide for the administration and development 
of Kampala as the capital city for Uganda‖ (Gore & Muwanga 2013, p. 12). This constitutional 
amendment paved the way for the legal and institutional reform of KCC into an executive 
agency. The choice of the new legal and institutional regime was a question of the quality of 
prior services delivered as well as ―historic tensions between multiple interests deeply involved 
in its governance‖(Ibid., p. 6). From a historical institutionalist point of view, it is critical that 
current behaviours of policy actors in the KCCA agency are only comprehended through a 
chronological examination of the temporal processes, ideas and junctures.   
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To appreciate the new KCCA‘s agency model in relation to interactions and the effect of such 
interactions in the matter of public decision-making, the historical institutionalism theory is 
applied to illuminate the chronological processes that help define the present-day depth and 
quality of public decisions in the agency. In applying historical institutionalism in the manner 
described above, the hypothesis to be tested is this:  
The current outcomes of public policies do not reflect the mere preferences or interests of the 
current strongest competitors but they are influenced by the existing and past institutional 
arrangements in which competition takes place.  
Similarly, Pierson & Skocpol (2002, p. 4) note that ―to develop explanatory arguments about 
important outcomes or puzzles, historical institutionalists take time seriously, specifying 
sequences and tracing transformations and processes of varying scale and temporality.‖ 
Historical institutionalists have been ―attentive to the way in which institutions distribute power 
unevenly across social groups‖ (Hall & Taylor, 1996a, p. 941). KCCA is a service delivery 
agency with elected political actors who represent varying social groups within the jurisdictional 
area under the agency. Historical institutionalism is clearly applicable because it does not assume 
that agency actors evenly play similar roles in influencing the policy processes but rather that the 
agency will give some individuals or interest groups unequal access to the decision-making 
processes. This is a critical proposition in exploring the impact of the political actors as 
representative of the consumers in the decision-making processes of the agency.  
In applying the historical institutionalism theoretical framework to appreciate and empirically 
come to logical conclusions regarding the agencification of KCC, this study applied the four 
tennets as espoused by Hall & Taylor (1996, p. 938) as follows:  
a) reflect on the relationships between the institution and the individual actors in relatively 
broad terms;  
b) highlight the asymmetries of power associated with the operation and establishment of the 
agency; 
c) consider the agencification of KCC as path dependent with unintended consequences and  
d) integrate into the analysis, the contributions of other kind of factors outside of the institution 
but within the broader political environment.  
However, in applying historical institutionalism, the study does not lose sight of the limitations 
of the theory including its ―incapability to cope with change‖(Peters et. al., 2005, p. 1275) and 
―its lack of a distinctive social ontology‖(Hay & Wincott, 1998, p. 953). Hall & Taylor, (1996, p. 
950) state that, historical institutionalism has devoted less attention than other schools to 
developing a sophisticated understanding of exactly how institutions affect behaviour, and some 
of its works are less careful than they should be about specifying the precise causal chain through 
which the institutions they identify as important, are affecting the behaviour they are meant to 
explain. 
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Historical institutionalists are inductive in nature and according to Hall & Taylor, (1996), ―they 
have been slower than others to aggregate their findings into systematic theories about the 
general processes involved in institutional creation and change.‖ To counteract the effects of the 
above limitations, the study analyses the thoughts, critical junctures and decisions responsible for 
the new agency model in the context of the economic and political forces at play. According to 
Peters et. al. (2005, p. 1277), ―without including some dynamic conception of agency, and … a 
greater role for political conflict, the approach cannot provide an adequate explanation for 
change.‖ This study makes reference to critical historical junctures, decisions and actor 
interactions, to understand the influence of temporal agency underpinnings on the concept of 
public decision-making in KCCA.  
 
3.4. Rational Choice Institutionalism  
 
Rational choice institutionalism emerges from the Rational choice perspective basically defined 
as ―the analysis of choices made by rational actors under conditions of interdependence‖ 
(Immergut, 1998, p. 12). Rational choice institutionalism is appropriate in this study because of 
its two core tenets; the strand is ―highly functionalist and largely intentionalist‖ (Hall & Taylor, 
1996a, p. 952). The theoretical strand is ―functionalist‖ because rational choice theorists explain 
the creation of an institution largely on the basis of the effects that follow, and intentionalist 
because the proponents assume that actors are always equipped with predetermined reasons for 
creating institutions, and are positioned to reap the effects of the institutional reforms.  
The agencification of KCC as earlier noted was necessitated because of poor service delivery but 
also a question of political tensions between government and opposition actors over its political 
control. According to Gore & Muwanga (2013, p. 3) ―the national government‘s takeover of 
Kampala was a well-planned effort to reclaim a powerful economic and political space that had 
been out of its reach since coming to power in 1986‖. Rational choice institutionalism is capable 
of supporting the validity of such claims by giving explanations, reached by observing the 
impacts of an institutional change.    
The scholarly Rational for the use of these two strands of institutionalism is that single 
perspective studies as earlier noted, have limitations. The application of different theoretical 
viewpoints therefore ensures more reliability of the findings. ―The rational choice school‘s 
emphasis on the coordinating functions of institutions (generating and maintaining equilibria) 
versus historical institutionalism‘s emphasis on how institutions emerge from and are embedded 
in concrete temporal processes‖ provides the point of tangency for this study in applying the two 
strands (Thelen, 1999, p. 371). In this study, historical institutionalism offers directions towards 
understanding how the transition from KCC to KCCA is a result of previous historic factors and 
how such factors influence the behaviours of current policy actors in the arena of public 
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decision-making, while rational choice institutionalism directs the study towards comprehending 
institutional change in light of the policy actions and impacts of current policy actors.  
This theoretical analytical proposition is informed precisely by Thelen (1999, p. 382), who 
asserts that;  
―Rational choice theorists tend to view institutions in terms of their coordinating functions; 
historical institutionalists see institutions as the legacy of concrete historical processes. In 
embracing this view, historical institutionalism brings questions of timing and temporality in 
politics (rather than equilibrium order) to the centre of the analysis of how institutions matter.‖ 
 
3.5. Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, the theoretical framework for this study is grounded in the historical and rational 
choice institutionalism theories. The two strands are capable of underpinning the exploration of 
past experiences, decisions and critical junctures that have influenced public decision-making 
processes in the KCCA agency, while at the same time explicating the KCCA agency 
phenomena in light of the current frame of policy decisions. The framework is also ideal in 
investigating formal and informal actor interactions sometimes called ―‗long lived equilibria‘ 
between the principal and agent‖(Verhoest and Verschuere, 2003, p. 10).  
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, DESIGN AND APPROACH 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The chapter illustrates the research methodology, design and approach in reference to the study 
objectives and research questions, and provides a basis for the analysis of the data collected. The 
overall objective of this study is to generate new knowledge about the KCCA agency phenomena 
and in particular the interplay between various actors in the policy arena and the extent to which 
the decisions from the agency reflect the views and aspirations of the political leaders as 
representatives of the people.  
An in-depth documentary analysis was undertaken, mainly on the literature behind the 
agencification model, the theoretical strands applied and the selected documents related to the 
KCCA agency. The analysis of documents was complemented by primary data collected from 
key informants. The theoretical framework was applied to appreciate the extent of public 
decision-making in the agency from both the temporal angle and impacts emerging from the 
institutional change. The case study approach enabled an exhaustive analysis of the structural 
disaggregation, managerial autonomy and contractualisation as key variants of the agencification 
model.  
 
4.2. Research Paradigm  
 
A paradigm is a ―loose collection of logically related assumptions, concepts, or propositions that 
orient thinking and research‖ (Robert, Bogdan, & Sari, 1982, p. 22). A paradigm seeks to support 
the analysis of research findings by clarifying on the epistemological belief and nature as well as 
research methodology and criteria of data collection. In order to set down the research intent, 
motivation and expectations, this study employed the constructivism paradigm of scientific 
inquiry, sometimes referred to as interpretivism. The constructivism paradigm in applied 
research point of departure is the ― world of human experience‖ (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 
2013, p. 36) upon which the researcher begins to socially construct meaning attached to the 
social reality. This study applied the constructivism paradigm to design and use methods that 
focus on the respondents as creators of knowledge based on their long lived experiences in light 
of the subject under study.  
The study therefore applied qualitative techniques of data collection and analysis to highlight 
with limited inconveniences, linkages ―that connect theoretical paradigm first to strategies of 
inquiry and second to methods for collecting data‖ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p. 22). This 
technique is well illustrated in a serial format as shown in Figure 1 below. In conducting the 
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study the values of multiple respondents, identified on the basis of their historical and technical 
knowledge of the institution, were carefully analysed. The constructivist hypothetical proposition 
assumes a relationship based on the existence of multiple realities. The multiple realities include; 
―a subjectivist epistemology (knower and respondent co-create understanding), and a natural 
world set of methodological procedures‖ Denzin and Lincoln (2005, p. 24). The constructivist 
paradigm appreciates the iterative nature of social research and places the researcher at the centre 
of the research processes while at the same time taking cognisance of the beliefs and viewpoints 
of the respondents.  
Figure 1: The systematic design and flow of presentation of the study design 
 
Source: adopted from Crotty (1998) in Creswell & Clark, (2007) 
 
4.3. Research Design 
 
The activities of collecting and analysing data, developing and modifying theory, elaborating or 
refocusing the research questions and identifying and addressing validity threats are usually all 
going on more or less simultaneously, each influencing all of the others (Maxwell, 2012, p. 3). 
The research design for this study was not set in a linear format neither did it begin with a 
predetermined point of departure; it was rather set in a flexible manner to enable an iterative 
process across all the stages. This design was informed by the choice of the constructivism 
Paradigm 
Worldview 
(beliefs, e.g. 
epistemology 
Theoretical 
Lens (e.g. 
feminist, racial) 
Methodological 
Approach (e.g. 
ethonography, 
mixed methods) 
Methods of data 
collection (e.g. 
interviews, 
checklist) 
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paradigm of scientific inquiry that gives direction to the qualitative methodologies and data 
analysis techniques.  
 
4.3.1. Case Study Approach in the Applied Component of the Research 
 
The study employed a case study approach. A case study is ―a qualitative approach in which the 
investigator explores a real-life, contemporary bounded system over time, through detailed, in-
depth data collection involving multiple sources of information‖ (Creswell 2012, p. 97). The 
Rational for the case study approach was that it ―optimizes understanding by pursuing scholarly 
research questions. It gains credibility by thoroughly triangulating the descriptions and 
interpretations, not just in a single step but continuously throughout the period of the study‖ 
(Denzin and Lincoln., 2005, p. 444 - 445).  
The case under study (unit of analysis) was the KCCA, a newly created executive agency, 
designed to deliver services to city dwellers using NPM approaches. The new agency is 
structured as an executive agency, administered by the central government but with embedded 
principles and practices of decentralised governance.  
The choice of the case study was informed by the problem under investigation and the choice of 
the theoretical framework. Within KCCA, the study sought to investigate and come to logical 
conclusions regarding public decision-making through the actor lenses; this was necessitated by 
the fact that the KCCA agency phenomena is designed to be structurally disaggregated from its 
parent ministry with a dualistic reporting hierarchy. In light of its dualistic nature, it was critical 
to ascertain the extent to which the decisions that emerge from the agency represent the interests 
of the public.  
 
4.3.2. Data Sources   
 
In light of the study design, two qualitative sources of information were applied in order to 
―reflect and attempt to secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question‖ 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2005, p. 5). The rationale for a qualitative methodology is that it provides 
for in-depth exploration of the problem, ―honours the voices of participants, maps the complexity 
of the situation, and conveys multiple perspectives of participants‖ (Creswell & Clark, 2007, p. 
5).  
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a) Documentary Analysis 
Documentary analysis as a research method involves the ―critical assessment of documents 
related to a conceptual area of interest with the aim of drawing relevancy and meanings beyond 
the stated text‖ (Wagner, et. al., 2012). According to Briggs & Coleman (2007, p. 279) 
documentary analysis is ―… a form of qualitative analysis that requires readers to locate, 
interpret, analyse and draw conclusions about the evidence presented.‖ 
Several documents were reviewed prior and during data collection including:  
 The 1995 Ugandan Constitution 
 The 1997 Local Governments Act:  
 The KCC Act (2010)  
 KCCA programme and strategic Reports  
 KCCA Ministerial Policy Statements 2010 – 2015 
 Relevant academic and media articles.  
During documentary analysis, information gathered was seen as constructs of what happened, 
what is happening and what is likely to happen based on a form of practical reasoning that 
renders the social order accountable and comprehensible. While earlier research designs meant 
that documentary analysis informs interviews, the qualitative nature of the research required 
more iterative processes with prior analysis of interview data, leading and pointing to the need 
for further review of literature and documents.   
Whereas documentary analysis was expected to save time and enable the research to be 
undertaken in a cost effective manner, the fact that the agency model is new meant limited 
availability of useful documents/literature. Even the analysis of media articles was limited due to 
lack of in-depth investigations on the agency model.  Indeed this study affirmed  the fact that ―it 
takes considerable skill to locate elusive documents and considerable interpretative skills are 
required to uncover the meaning of the contents‖ (Briggs & Coleman 2007, p. 280).  
The documents analysed throughout the study enabled the researcher appreciate the history of 
KCC and in particular the reasons why government took over the management and 
administration of KCC. The review of the legal frameworks particularly the KCC Act (2010), the 
1995 Uganda Constitution and the Local Government Act (1997) provided firm evidence 
regarding the centrality of the various actors in the arena of public decision-making within the 
agency. This partly informed the initial list of key persons to be interviewed. Documentary 
analysis also informed the design of the interview guide, and information generated equally 
guided probing during the interviews.  
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b) Interviews  
The interview is a grounded technique of the socio-constructivist paradigm of scientific inquiry. 
The interviewing method, especially the use of key informants for in-depth information, was the 
main technique for this study. The use of key-informants helped draw meanings from lived 
experiences of both prior and current policy actors in KCCA, taking into consideration their 
unique beliefs, values and knowledge related to the agencification of KCC and their perspectives 
of current outcomes of policy choices. Interview as a method for this study was supported by 
DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree (2006, p. 314), who contend that ―the purpose of the qualitative 
research interview is to contribute to a body of knowledge that is conceptual and theoretical and 
is based on the meanings that life experiences hold for the interviewees.‖ 
The interviews were based on unstructured, open-ended questions, judiciously drawn into a key 
informant interview schedule as a reference guide throughout the face-to-face engagements. In 
referring to the same interview schedule during all the face-to-face interviews, the researcher‘s 
objective ensured consistency of interviews as well as ease of data analysis. Academic literature 
shows that ―the structure should be sufficiently flexible to enable the interviewee raise issues and 
shape the content of the interview, at least to some extent, to allow responses to be probed and 
explored‖ (Ritchie, Lewis, Lewis, Nicholls, & Ormston, 2013, p. 183).  
The implication of this is thus to draw an interview schedule that is not an end in itself but rather 
a means to the end insofar as enabling probing based on the bilateral exchange of information is 
concerned. Using the interview schedule, the researcher comfortably interacted with the 
respondents in a conversational manner, enabling probing and in-depth investigations in light of 
the responses and inter-interview analysis.  
Using an interview guide, a carefully selected number of respondents with historical and 
technical knowledge about Kampala City Council and events surrounding its agencification were 
interviewed. Diversity in opinion was ensured through a purposive selection of former and 
current political actors and technical officers.  
The Interview Process 
Key informant interviews were conducted as follows;  
i. The researcher sought official introduction letters from the Faculty of Commerce, Law and 
Management, indicating that he is undertaking an academic study in partial fulfilment of the 
degree of Management in the field of Public Policy. 
ii. The researcher then officially wrote to KCCA attaching the introduction letter from the 
faculty, the university identification, the research proposal and the proposed interview 
schedule. This communication indicated the kind of study being undertaken, the proposed 
bureaucrats and political actors to interview as well as the timelines for the interview. In the 
letter, the researcher indicated how KCCA will benefit from the study. 
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iii. The research adopted a flexible approach regarding the venue of the face to face interviews. 
During the fixing of appointments, the researcher indicated an open public space that 
guarantees a one-to-one private discussion but was quick to allow for alternative suggestions 
from the respondents. The research was conducted in English. Three key informants (The 
Deputy Lord Mayor, the KCCA Spokesperson and a former councillor in the previous local 
governing council) opted to give the interview in their offices. The remaining five key 
informants were interviewed in public spaces.   
iv. While each interview was designed to last 45 minutes, 4 of the interviews with the deputy 
Lord Mayor, two current councillors and one previous councillor last well over 1:30 hours. 
The interview process was stretched well over three weeks to enable the researcher reflect on 
the emerging information and begin to draw themes. Indeed each proceeding interview 
benefited from the previous conversations.  
v. To ensure fulltime focus, interactions and probing, all key informant interviews were audio 
record using a tape recorder only on the explicit documented consent of the respondents. In 
all cases, the researcher complimented the audio recordings with some writing on the key 
issues and areas for probing.  
 
Eight key informants were interviewed as follows;  
Key Informant Place of Interview Date  
The Minister for Kampala Affairs at the time of 
the study 
Office July 4, 2016 
The Deputy Lord Mayor Office July 21, 2016 
The Spokesperson of KCCA  Office August 3, 2016 
One councillor at the time of study Home July 13, 2016 
One councillor at the time of study Cafe July 16, 2016 
One former councillor  Home July 12, 2016 
One former councillor Office August 3, 2016 
One Member of Parliament representing a 
constituency in Kampala 
Parliament August 24, 2016 
 
In all these interviews, an interview consistency matrix attached as appendix was used through 
the process.  
 
4.3.3. Data Collection  
 
a) Introduction  
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The design of data collection instruments was cognisant of the qualitative nature of the study.  
Data was mainly collected from two sources; documents and interviews. Interviews resulted in 
voluminous sets of data, necessitating longer hours of transcribing and analysis, but crucially 
providing greater breadth in understanding the issues under study. The underlying socio-
constructivist paradigm was sufficient in guiding the researcher towards the kind of respondents, 
techniques and institutions for relative interpretative information. To ease analysis, the study 
adopted one key principle espoused by Creswell (2012, p. 47) that ―in the entire qualitative 
research process, the researchers keep a focus on learning the meaning that the participants hold 
about the problem or issue, not the meaning that the researchers bring to the research or writers 
from the literature‖.  
b) Data Collection Instruments 
Table 3: The instruments for data collection and the descriptions 
Data collection 
Technique 
Description of data collection instruments 
Documentary 
analysis 
In undertaking documentary analysis, the study applied three distinct 
techniques; semiotics, discourse and interpretive analysis.  
Semiotics was used to identify the underlying meanings in the documents.  
Discourse and interpretive analysis helped identify the hidden meaning in the 
documents reviewed.  
The analysis of documents then followed the arrangement of themes of the 
study. 
Key Informant 
Interviews 
 
Using a set of pre-determined unstructured and open-ended questions, a key 
informant guide (interview schedule) was developed to enable the researcher 
follow a systematic pattern across the sets of interviews. The key informant 
guide was structured in sections to cover the research themes.  
 
The interviews were audio recorded to enable the researcher reduce on the 
writings while interviewing but also closely follow the emotions, feelings 
and tone of the responses. This was critical for drawing initial meanings but 
also for probing.  
 
 
4.3.4.  Sampling  
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The study targeted diversity in responses by selecting political actors and bureaucrats that were 
part of KCC as well as those under the new KCCA. The choice of diversity was informed by the 
qualitative nature of the study but also supported by case study approach which according to 
Creswell (2012, p. 156) requires the application of ―maximum variation as a sampling strategy to 
represent diverse cases and to fully describe multiple perspectives about the cases.‖ Maximum 
variation as a strategy required the application of some form of criteria that enabled the 
researcher to identify and interview distinct respondents about the same variables. The researcher 
generally applied the snowball technique to get to other respondents who worked with KCC; 
these respondents could have a wealth of information on the case under study. Using maximum 
variation and snowball, respondents were identified from the following sub-groups:  
a) bureaucrats that occupied key positions in KCC between 2000 and 2010;  
b) previous political actors during the electoral periods 2001 to 2005 and 2006 to 2011; 
c) current bureaucrats in key positions within the new KCCA and  
d) current political actors in the agency, the executive as well as Members of Parliament.  
The research starting point was documentary analysis to provide the basis for initial general 
themes and aid the setup of a starting list of individuals and institutions likely to be significant 
sources of information.  
4.3.5. Data Analysis 
 
Data analysis in qualitative studies begins with the conceptual planning and arrangement of data 
around themes to create wider databases capable of being analysed. The themes are then coded, 
which according to Creswell (2012, p. 184) ―involves aggregating the text or visual data into 
small categories of information, seeking evidence for the code from different databases being 
used in the study‖. The development of codes is followed by further shrinking of the information 
through the application of high analytical skills to give rise to text which is ―then recreated as a 
working interpretive document that contains the writer‘s initial attempts to make sense of what 
he/she has learned‖ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Data analysis for this study followed a phased 
sequential pattern espoused by McMillan & Schumacher (2014) as shown in Figure 2 below.  
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Figure 2: A graphical illustration of the data analysis process for the study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: McMillan & Schumacher (2014) 
 
Whereas data analysis is presented in a sequential format as shown in Figure 2 above, the actual 
process was iterative requiring back and forth encounters throughout the identified phases.  This 
study had three types of field data sets: interview scripts written by the researcher during the 
face-to-face interviews; transcribed information from audio recordings and materials from the 
documentary review. The set of data collected enabled the researcher to do preliminary thinking 
of how to sieve out relevant information from the huge datasets bearing in mind the need to use 
the text to adduce evidence in support of the findings.  
After the preliminary thinking, the researcher undertook a review of the data with the sole aim of 
reducing the bulky datasets into codes. At this stage, the researcher inductively (from bottom to 
specific to general) begun to build the patterns, categories and themes intended to provide initial 
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28 
 
information that is capable of being analysed. In creating the themes, the researcher maintained 
thematically relevant quotes and phrases to build evidence relevant to the case study. Beyond 
identifying relevant quotes, the researcher also paraphrased and summarised the text with a view 
to reducing the bulky texts into more presentable formats. Real analysis resulted in the 
identification of relevant quotes, summaries and paraphrases. This enabled the researcher to 
begin the process of creating themes by analysing text of one interview against another and in the 
process, identifying recurring themes and discourses across the text. It‘s at this moment, that the 
researcher begun to draw experiences, values, attitudes and ideas significant to the central theme 
of the study.  
 
4.3.6. Validity and Reliability  
 
This is mainly a qualitative study whose scientific view of phenomena is context-specific and is 
based on multiple realities whose point of arrival is that the researcher and respondent co-create 
knowledge. The findings in this study are not arrived at using statistical or quantifiable means of 
analysis and ―unlike quantitative researchers who seek causal determination, prediction, and 
generalization of findings, qualitative researchers seek instead illumination, understanding, and 
extrapolation to similar situations‖ (Golafshani, 2003, p. 600).  
In further comparison, quantitative research is keen on the concept of compatibility of findings to 
the research methods applied, carefully using statistics and words to arrive at logical conclusions; 
qualitative research on the other hand, argues from a paradigmatic point of view, making use of 
conversations, interpretive and creative skills or observations of the subject being studied.  
However, this study indeed recognizes that ―validity and reliability are two factors which any 
qualitative researcher should be concerned about while designing a study, analyzing results and 
judging the quality of the study‖(Patton, 1990, p. 41). To begin with, the validity and reliability 
of this study is discussed in terms of the credibility but importantly generalizability of the 
findings. However, in discussing the validity and reliability of this study, it‘s important to note 
that the constructivism paradigm of scientific inquiry and in particular the techniques of data 
collection and analysis applied, heavily rely on the view that knowledge and reality is creatively 
and rigorously constructed by both the researcher and the respondent based on the social 
interactions between the subject of research and the real world.  
In view of this, there is a high probability that the reliability of a qualitative study may be 
questioned because of the multiple realities emerging from the multiple constructions eminent in 
a qualitative process.  
In order to arrive at the validity and reliability of this study and indeed its findings, the starting 
point was that ―constructivism values multiple realities that people have in their minds. 
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Therefore, to acquire valid and reliable multiple and diverse realities, multiple methods of 
searching or gathering data are in order‖ (Golafshani, 2003, p. 604). This study applied two 
distinct techniques of collecting data; first was documentary analysis, which critically examined 
literature and reports related to the agencification of KCC with the aim of locating, interpreting, 
analyzing and drawing meanings. Second was the use of key informant interviews, with careful 
selection of respondents with the technical and historical knowledge of the agencification of 
KCC. Using open ended key informant guides, the researcher provided an open opportunity for 
respondents to not only direct the research but also point to essential reports and documents for 
analysis in light of the realities emerging from the conversations. Indeed the key issues from the 
documents were juxtaposed with the key issues in the interviews to enable the research reliably 
arrive at the findings.  
 
4.4. Limitations of the Study 
 
The major limitation of the study was the lack of essential recorded information and documents 
about agencification in Uganda. Despite being one of the pioneer countries to agencify in the 
region, the researcher struggled to find essential literature on the case under study. In effect, 
there are no available writings on the KCC agencification process beyond what is written in the 
KCC Act (2010) and a few media articles. Even across the written academic repositories, policy 
and political scientists have restricted their scholarly work on the definition and policy transfer of 
agencification, but little on the agency structural disaggregation and what it means for policy 
decision-making that centres on the public interest.  
 
4.5. Ethical Considerations 
 
Ethical standards affect the validity of the research findings. In socio-constructivist scientific 
inquiry, the researcher is bound to ―recognize the importance of the subjectivity of their own 
lens, acknowledge the powerful position they have in the research, and admit that the participants 
are the true owners of the information collected‖ (Creswell 2012, p. 25). During the face-to-face 
interviews, the researcher ensured that his intellectual and personal views were not superimposed 
on to the discussion issues during the interface. Indeed, the researcher exhibited the highest level 
of listening skills and only interrupted the conversations on points of clarification and further 
probing questions.   
Importantly, the researcher sought an official letter from the University introducing him to 
KCCA as a student undertaking research solely for academic reasons. This enabled an informed 
consent from the leadership of KCCA as well as individual respondents prior to the 
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commencement of the study. The introductory communication to the respondents was explicit 
and indicated that the researcher will maintain the highest level of confidentiality and assurances 
that the findings of the study are purely for academic purposes and will not be used for any other 
undertaking.   
The face-to-face interviews were generally conducted in open public spaces unless otherwise 
requested by the interviewee. A recording device was used after explicit permission from the 
respondent but also assurance that the data collected will be held in confidence and deleted after 
the research process. Individual names of respondents have not been included in the study report. 
Instead, a pseudo-name or just ‗key informant‘ is applied.  
 
4.6. Conclusions  
 
This chapter explored and presented the underlying paradigm of scientific inquiry, going in-
depth to rationalize the paradigm and how it links to both the methods as well as analysis of data. 
Explanations were adduced in relation to the data sources, reliability and validity as well as the 
ethical issues and limitations encountered.  
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CHAPTER 5: STUDY FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS OF PUBLIC 
DECISION-MAKING IN KCCA 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the empirical research findings in light of the theoretical framework of the 
study and the review of scholarly and reported literature on the agencification of KCC. The 
findings are presented in a sequential format reflecting the research questions and broad themes 
of the study. Each finding is evidenced by a quote (s) from the primary data collected or excerpts 
from literature and documents reviewed. The findings are also presented in response to the 
statement of the problem, which is categorically illustrative of the research questions for the 
study. Each finding is discussed thereafter with attempts to situate the findings in the broader 
agencification and new public management doctrines.  
 
5.2. Review of the Research Questions 
 
The study applied the historical and Rational choice institutionalism, and the primary research 
question was: how are policy decisions arrived at in KCCA which has a dualistic reporting and 
accountability structure? This was broken down into four secondary research questions as 
follows:  
a) To what extent does the law that set up KCCA enhance public decision-making in a dualistic 
reporting structure? 
b) To what extent do political leaders (councillors) influence KCCA‘s decision-making 
processes? 
c) To what extent do technocrats influence KCCA‘s decision-making processes?  
d) What needs to be done to address the challenges (if any) resulting from KCCA‘s decision-
making processes which has a dualistic character? 
 
5.3. Research Findings and Discussions 
 
5.3.1. The Law Establishing KCCA and its Ability to Enable Public Decision-Making 
 
Kampala City was governed under the Local Governments Act (1997) as a district with a 
popularly elected Executive Mayor during the period 1998 – 2010. Following several political 
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and managerial contestations between the central government and the management of the city, 
Government in 2005 amended Article 5 of the 1995 Constitution to provide for Kampala as the 
capital city of Uganda which shall be administered by the central government. The takeover of 
Kampala did not happen until 2010, when parliament passed the KCC Act (2010) as a new legal 
framework, paving the way for establishment of KCCA as an executive agency to deliver 
services for and on behalf of the central government.  
To logically comprehend the central question of the extent to which the legal framework enables 
public decision-making, it is imperative to empirically adduce the relative legal provisions in the 
Act as a point of reference. The KCCA, Act 2010 provides for an elected Lord Mayor and 
councilors (see section 6) who shall constitute the Authority as a policy-making and 
representative political organ of the people of Kampala. On account, the Act envisions the 
Authority (Lord Mayor and councilors) as the primary avenue through which policy concerns of 
the people of Kampala will reach the deliberative and decision-making platforms within the 
agency. With the Lord Mayor as the political head of the Authority, the law further provides for 
an Executive Director (section 17) as the CEO of the agency, appointed by the President and 
bestowed with several administrative and management responsibilities including:  
a) Advising the Mayor and Authority on Government policy  
b) Overseeing the delivery of quality services to the population within the Capital City and 
taking remedial action where service delivery standards are below the expected minimum 
standards   
c) Making reports to the Authority and the Minister on the state of affairs of the Capital City at 
least once a year or as the Minister or the Authority may determine 
 
Further to the above, the Act in section 79 (2) provides for the powers of the Minister for 
Kampala Affairs and states thus ―the Minister shall have general powers to give directives on 
policy and general development of the Capital City and the Authority shall comply with the 
directives‖. The Minister is also vested with veto powers as and when decisions taken by the 
Authority are deemed illegal or in circumstances where the Authority is deemed to have failed to 
perform its duties.  
The finding in relation to the legal framework and public decision making is that the KCC Act 
(2010) explicitly provides for a central role for elected leaders to partake in the policy-making 
processes of the agency. However, the same law also provides for a Minister for Kampala 
Affairs as the political supervisor with overriding powers to veto and rescind the decisions 
reached at by the Authority. The cited legal provisions have on numerous occasions been 
variously interpreted by the actors involved in the management and governance of KCCA, 
resulting, into political and legal contestations between the political wing on one side and the 
technical wing together with the Minister, on the other side. From several respondents, the clash 
in responsibilities among the three actors (Authority, Executive Director and Minister) has 
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limited public decision-making in the agency. One key informant from the political wing had this 
to say;  
…when you look at the Act, it says the Authority which is a combination of the Lord Mayor and 
the councillors shall be the supreme policy body at KCCA but in the same section (79), talks 
about the powers of the Minister who can even overturn decisions of the Authority. 
The Authority which derives its leadership mandate from the people bears a legal responsibility 
to ensure that the interests of the public reign central in the policy decisions emerging from the 
agency. The Lord Mayor as head of the Authority ―has a dual responsibility to KCCA and to his 
electorate, in executing all his functions. However, he is also answerable to the Minister 
responsible to the Capital City‖ (Karyeija & Kyohairwe, 2012, p. 112). This intricate structure 
with the elected representatives having their policy decisions vetoed and possibly rescinded by 
the Minister re-affirms that the agencification of KCC was largely political with intent to have it 
firmly in the hands of the central government.  
Interpretation of the Finding  
The KCC Act (2010) is the legal instrument that establishes the agency and at the same time 
provides for a structure with three power centres (Authority, Executive Director and Minister for 
Kampala).  It‘s evident from the above finding that the law explicitly provides for a central role 
of elected leaders to influence the policies that emerge from the agency. The agencification of 
KCC as earlier noted was a response to service delivery challenges emanating from 
mismanagement and maladministration of KCC by locally elected leaders in the city. The design 
of the current legal framework was to the extent, possibly intended to curtail the influence of 
political leaders in the administration and management of the city by placing the responsibility to 
govern the city in the hands of the central government through the Minister for Kampala Affairs 
and the Executive Director. 
Indeed, the agencification of KCC resonated with a carefully calculated campaign by the central 
government to reduce the powers of elected leaders at the local government level. In 2005, 
Government amended the Local Government Act (1997) and ―stripped Local Councils of the 
authority to hire or fire district Chief Administrative Officers‖ (Karyeija & Kyohairwe, 2012, p. 
44). This was the first major step by the government to limit the influence of locally elected 
leaders in local government affairs and indeed increase its own mandate and authority to 
influence governance at the same level. The design of Uganda‘s decentralisation policy was 
contextualised to have local leaders ―be able to assess the detailed needs and priorities on behalf 
of those they represent in order to make those choices‖ (Devas & Grant, 2003, p. 308). Over 
time, there has been a gradual decline in their powers and mandate to effectively represent the 
interests of the citizens.  
The argument therefore is that the manner in which the law was hurriedly presented to 
Parliament during the heat of the 2011 general elections meant a well-calculated move by 
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government to limit public consultations that would have supported an enabling legislation for 
public decision-making both in form and practice. The spirit of the law and in particular the 
provisions that give the Minister for Kampala affairs overwhelming powers over and above those 
of the elected leaders in matters of policy within the agency is testimony. With this reality, 
Uganda is entering into a new era of public administration without effective citizen voice in 
policy affairs. This is against a long held ―theoretical and practical recognition that the public 
must be more involved in public decisions‖ (King, Feltey, & Susel, 1998, p. 319). Yet despite 
this, Uganda‘s government is now more decisive about limiting public involvement in public 
administration.  
In creating an executive agency while at the same maintaining aspects of local government 
practices and procedures, government was creating a new model of public administration, never 
before seen anywhere else. The traditional agency model will have the head of the agency 
reporting directly to the parent minister as is the case in the UK Next Program or to the 
permanent secretary as it is in Tanzania. The KCC Act (2010) which established the KCCA 
agency created a unique model with a bureaucracy reporting to multiple centers, an Authority of 
locally elected leaders with policy functions and a line Minster solely responsible for agency 
policy making and supervision. The current challenges (see section 5.3.4. above) confronting the 
agency were therefore eminent.  
In conclusion, the KCC Act (2010) provides for a central role of elected leaders in policy-making 
but current practices such as policies being vetoed by the Minister curtails public decision 
making. KCCA, though with features of a local government system, remains a central 
government agency legally and in practice.  
 
5.3.2. The Policy Influence of Elected Leaders in KCCA  
 
To arrive at a logical finding regarding the policy influence of elected leaders in KCCA, this 
study looks at some of the reasons for government takeover of KCC. The review of literature and 
indeed analysis of interview data reveals that the reasons that necessitated government to 
takeover Kampala are varied and contextual, temporal but also partisan. The reasons range from 
mismanagement and maladministration which led to poor service delivery and corruption within 
KCC, to partisan and economic considerations.  
Politically, leaders aligned to opposition political parties had governed the city since the 
establishment of the decentralised system of governance in 1998. Under the Local Governments 
Act (1997), Kampala was classified as a district and this therefore had implications regarding the 
amount of funding from the central government meant for recurrent and development 
expenditure. According to one key informant, ―KCC used to get about UGX: 40 billion from the 
central government” which was insufficient to adequately provide for the range of services 
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required for a modern city. With this inadequate funding came a myriad of service delivery 
challenges intertwined with gross corruption, with the city unable to efficiently deliver basic 
services as well as undertake administrative and management responsibilities. The years 
preceding the takeover, KCC was unable to ‗collect taxes, effectively collect and dispose waste, 
fill potholes or approve building plans without a bribe‘ according to Gore & Muwanga (2014, p. 
9).  
Indeed, in 2010, the country‘s Auditor General instituted an inquiry into solid waste management 
in the city with its report indicating that ―out of the 1,200–1,500 tons of garbage estimated to be 
generated in Kampala per day, only 400–500 tons were collected yet KCC spends about UGX: 
2.08 billion annually on solid waste management” (Oluka, 2010). Defending the government 
takeover of Kampala, the Observer newspaper (Administrator, 2009) quoting the Minister of 
Local Government noted that;  
A Government takeover of the capital, Kampala was inevitable because the city was grossly 
mismanaged; the traffic congestion, the market wrangles, and the dust and the unprecedented 
collapse of buildings in Kampala were some of the reasons that pushed government to step in.  
One other major reason for government takeover of Kampala was on economic considerations. 
Kampala is Uganda‘s main commercial centre and together with its environs, it boosts of a daily 
residential and working population of 3.5 million people. ―It‘s estimated that about 80 percent of 
the country's industrial sector is located in Kampala and the City generates about 50 percent of 
national GDP‖ (World Bank, 2014, p. 1). This economic position, coupled with poor service 
delivery, compounded by the fact that the city was in the hands of opposition leaders, left 
government and in particular the ruling party concerned. One political key informant had this to 
say;  
The ruling party (NRM) felt the need to have Kampala turned around, so it had to look for a 
structure that would both answer the demands of the society as well as reposition the city to lead 
Uganda’s economic growth efforts. 
The narrative and indeed evidence above, regarding government takeover of Kampala is an 
indicator as to why the administration and management of KCC was recentralised. As a local 
government unit, elected political leaders governed the city and indeed maintained a strong 
public interest mandate in matters of policy. With the new legal framework and creation of an 
executive agency, the centrality of elected leaders in the policy-making processes is provided for 
but their influence is being questioned as illuminated in the following section.  
In 2012, following the clashes in the interpretation of the law, the Lord Mayor was forced out of 
office by a tribunal constituted by the Minister on charges of abuse of office and failure to 
convene authority meetings. According to a key informant from the KCCA technical wing, 
―business continued as normal with the Minister fully assuming the policy making function and 
indeed offered strategic guidance to the agency throughout the remainder of the three years‖. 
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Another example arose in 2011 when the Authority felt it necessary to discipline the Executive 
Director for her ‗handling of policy implementation‘ in the city but would not find a provision in 
the Act to apply; a key informant who was a member of the previous Authority had this to say;  
Can you hold someone responsible when you don’t appoint him/her? There is a time when the 
authority concluded that the Executive Director was high-handed in implementing certain 
policies, and the Authority wanted to have her removed from office. We (political leaders) looked 
at the provisions of the law and we did not have that mandate as the Authority. It’s only the 
appointing authority, in this case the president who can remove the Executive Director. 
Following the correct legal interpretation of who wields the power to sanction the CEO of 
KCCA, political leaders wrote to the President demanding an immediate removal of the CEO 
from the agency and up to the time of writing this report (4 years) the President had not acted on 
the request. This is an obvious reminder of the centrality of government and in particular, the 
person of the president in influencing agency management and policy.  
The study finding therefore is that despite a clear policy-making role within the legal framework 
establishing KCCA, elected leaders in Kampala city have been in-practice, relegated to the role 
of policy participants with overwhelming policy-making powers vested in the central 
government through the Minister for Kampala Affairs. The above reasons advanced as 
justifications for the agencification of KCC provide evidence that government‘s intention was to 
reposition itself as a central policy maker. The World Bank (2014, p. 5), one of the development 
partners supporting several development initiatives in Kampala notes that government‘s intention 
―was to improve the administration of Kampala City and provide services to the public within an 
effective, efficient and accountable framework under the direct supervision of the Central 
Government‖. The provision in the KCC Act (2010) that empowers the Minister to veto and 
rescind the decisions of the Authority exemplifies the notion that Central Government through 
the Minister is not only the main policy actor in the agency but that the reasons for the takeover 
of KCC are largely political.  
Interpretation of the Finding 
Despite the limitations brought about by various interpretations of the legislation establishing 
KCCA, and in particular veto powers of the Minister over the decisions of the elected leaders in 
matters of policy, the structures for policy engagement are provided for both within the agency 
but also with other organs of government. The Lord Mayor is mandated under section 11 (e) of 
the KCC Act (2010) to ―head the Authority in developing strategies and programmes for the 
development of the Capital City‖ and has the sole powers to convene and chair Authority 
meetings. There are also internal mechanisms to have councilors organized into working groups 
in accordance with the 10 directorates to enable them scrutinize the policy implementation work 
of the bureaucrats as well as develop agenda items for the authority meetings which in essence 
would constitute public decisions.  
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Section 8 (1) of the KCC Act (2010) states that ―the Authority shall have power to make 
ordinances of the Authority not inconsistent with the Constitution or any other law made by 
Parliament‖ and section 8 (2) states that ―the power of the Authority to make ordinances shall be 
exercised by the passing of local bills into ordinances by the Authority and signed by the Lord 
Mayor‖. The Lord Mayor in addition to the above and as provided for in section 58 (1) has 
mandate to recommend to the minister the appointment of a public accounts committee of the 
authority which shall have mandate to examine the reports of the Auditor General on the 
financial management in the agency. It‘s therefore argued that notwithstanding the limitations, 
the KCCA agency structure and several provisions within the law provide for spaces for elected 
leaders to engage in policy-making and indeed represent the interests of the citizens who voted 
them.  
The legal boundaries regarding the roles of the three main actors (Minister, Executive Director 
and Mayor) are not clearly demarcated in the law and there are many instances where roles 
overlap.  The Executive Director in execution of her roles, reports to several power centers 
which undermines modern new public management principles that call for clear reporting 
hierarchies in organisations. As a result ―the two leaders of the Capital City have tended to run 
the affairs of the authority in a parallel manner with each one of them claiming equal and 
overlapping power over the control of the Capital City‖ (Karyeija & Kyohairwe, 2012, p. 112). 
The contestations arising out of the overlapping mandates have elevated the Executive Director 
to a powerful position in all matters of policy by virtue of the fact that KCCA is an agency under 
the central government.   
Whereas the law establishing KCCA mandates the Executive Director to report to the Authority, 
the same law does not allow political leaders to discipline either the Executive Director or any 
member of the agency staff in instances of performance failures or non-adherence to Authority 
policy decisions. In conclusion, political leaders contrasted with the bureaucrats, influence to a 
less extent the decisions that emerge from the agency.  
 
5.3.3. The Policy Influence of Technocrats in KCCA 
 
The KCCA technical wing is constituted of 472 employees and is headed by the Executive 
Director who is appointed by the president for a 5-year renewable term of office (KCC Act, 
2010). The KCC Act (2010) bestows upon the Executive Director a multitude of administration, 
management and policy roles and responsibilities, with the following as key:  
a) Accounting officer of the agency 
b) Head of public service in the authority 
c) Coordinating and implementing national and Authority policies, laws, regulations, by-laws, 
programmes and projects 
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d) Advising the Mayor and Authority on Government policy 
e) Overseeing the delivery of quality services to the population within the Capital City, and 
taking remedial action where service delivery standards are below the expected minimum 
standards 
f) Liaising with the Central Government and other institutions on behalf of the Authority. 
An appreciation of the influence of KCCA technocrats over policy and public decision making 
commences from the review of legal provisions pertaining to the responsibilities as well as their 
contemporary behaviours related to policy implementation and impact within the agency 
jurisdiction. Throughout the interviews with key informants, the issues of role clarity and clash 
of responsibilities amongst the Authority (Lord Mayor/councillors), Executive Director and 
Minister were echoed. One of the key informants from the ruling party illuminated this by 
asserting that;  
The key actor in the agency policy cycle is mainly the Executive Director; she has a lot of powers 
under the law; and the minister also has some powers. The Lord Mayor and councillors should 
have been key actors but they do not play their politics well and the basic principle is playing 
your politics well and according to the law, Kampala is administered by the central government. 
In affirmation of the above, some of the key responsibilities for the Executive Director are to 
―liaise with the central government and other institutions on behalf of the Authority‖ as well as 
―advise the Mayor and Authority on Government policy‖ (KCC Act, 2010). In essence, the 
Executive Director combines technical responsibilities with policy roles. These responsibilities 
are derived from the central notion that the agency is directly administered by the central 
government and the Executive Director, who is appointed by the president, is directly 
responsible for agency affairs. In a key informant interview, one of the current political leaders 
indicated that the Authority can request the Executive Director to explain the different aspects 
that are being implemented, she makes a report, we can critique, guide, give opinion, even direct 
them on what to do but we cannot sanction her or any of her employees.  
The contestations regarding the centrality of the various actors in the policy-making processes 
and in particular the powers of the Authority to make policies, but which policies can be vetoed 
or even rescinded by the Minister, are evident that the technical actors not only play a policy 
implementation role but greatly influence the policy-making process. The finding therefore is 
that policy-making in KCCA is not merely a matter of the legal provisions in the KCC Act 
(2010) but rather a consequence of the policy practices that highly empower the bureaucrats as 
representatives of the central government through the line Minister for Kampala Affairs.   
Interpretation of the Finding 
In a traditional executive agency, the bureaucrats are expected to implement the policies set forth 
by the parent ministry while the minister, as a political actor plays an oversight role to ensure 
that the agency is realising its policy objectives. Executive agencies are expected to operate 
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under NPM principles that emphasize quantity, quality and efficiency in service delivery.  Under 
the KCCA agency, it‘s clear that the bureaucracy headed by the Executive Director has 
managerial autonomy majorly with regards to policy implementation but also to some extent 
policy-making. This reality has lessened political control but at the same time resulted into a 
reduced role of elected politicians in matters of policy-making and review. As earlier noted, 
elected leaders can advise, guide and direct the agency bureau on matters of policy, but have no 
mandate to sanction the managers for their actions or inactions across the policy cycle.  
In essence the central government takeover of the administration and management of Kampala 
city is practical of government‘s earlier recentralisation efforts aimed at weakening the 
decentralisation policy that vested significant power and authority in the hands of elected leaders. 
The managers in the KCCA agency have become ‗street level‘ front-line workers who 
significantly influence the delivery of public services in the city; they determine which 
programmes should be designed and who is eligible; they allocate resources through the budget 
process; they enforce compliance and impose sanctions and have mandate to exempt individuals 
and businesses from taxes. ‗‗Given their position at the interface of the state and the citizens, and 
their opportunities to exercise discretion, front-line managers exert influence well beyond their 
formal authority‘‘(Meyers & Vorsanger, 2007, p. 154). The opportunity to interface with the 
citizens and authority to operate with a level of discretion, the agency managers have technically 
pushed the political actors to the periphery of policy making which in principle involves the 
rationalised allocation of scarce resources. In Michael Lipsky‘s (1980) description as quoted in 
Meyers & Vorsanger, (2007, p. 154), agency managers ‗‗…not only deliver but actively shape 
policy outcomes by interpreting rules and allocating scarce resource‘‘ 
Bureaucrats managing KCCA affairs to a great extent not only play a policy implementation 
function, but equally influence the shape of policy as a consequence of their discretionary 
powers enshrined in the KCCA Act (2010).  It‘s a reality supported by the intent of the 
agencification process, which underscored the need to have the city firmly in the hands of the 
central government.   
 
5.3.4.  Challenges to KCCA’s Decision-Making Processes 
 
The study finds out three major challenges to KCCA‘s decision making processes: first are the 
flaws in the law establishing the agency; second is the multiple reporting and accountability 
centres and third is the limited role of political actors in the policy-making and oversight 
processes. These challenges are discussed in detail below.  
 
a) The Flaws in the Law Establishing the Agency 
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The design of the legislation to agencify KCC was rushed with minimal stakeholder 
consultations. The law was ―brought in the heat of the campaigns (2010 - 2011 general 
elections), nobody really paid attention to it; it was tabled in Parliament on the 28
th
 December 
(2010) and politicians had been nominated and were already on the campaign trails‖ (Key 
informant interview with a Government official). The lack of stakeholder consultations meant 
that those likely to be affected by the legislation were not given the time and opportunity to share 
their views that would have gone a long way in addressing some of the flaws such as role clarity 
among the various actors.  
Another key informant, a political leader at the time the legislation was being debated, confirmed 
the same narrative, stating that “no one was consulted, not even myself yet I was councillor then 
(2010); there were neither stakeholder nor citizen consultations”. The Report of the 
Parliamentary committee on Presidential Affairs that handled the bill did not indicate any 
consultations that were made during the mandatory public hearing. The challenge therefore is a 
legal framework whose provisions regarding the distribution of policy-making power are highly 
contested among the key actors, and this has resulted in unending political fights and court 
battles between the political wing headed by the Lord Mayor and the technical wing headed by 
the Executive Director.  
b) The Matrix Agency Structure 
The KCC Act (2010) presents a structure with multiple reporting and power responsibilities 
known as a matrix agency structure involving the Executive Director, Lord Mayor and Minister 
as follows;  
 The Executive Director ―shall be responsible for the management of all public funds of the 
Authority and accountable to Parliament‖ Section 19 (c) of the KCC Act (2010) 
 The Executive Director shall be ―responsible to the Authority (Lord Mayor), subject to the 
general directions of the Minister‖ Section 19 (t) of the KCC Act (2010) 
 The Executive Director shall on the ―day to day operations, be responsible to the Authority‖ 
Section 19 (u) of the KCC Act (2010) 
 The Executive Director shall ―make reports to the Authority and the Minister on the state of 
affairs of the capital city at least once a year or as the Minister or the Authority may 
determine‖ Section 19 (v)   
 The Lord Mayor ―shall in the performance of his or her functions, be answerable to the 
Authority and the Minister‖ Section 11 (2) of the KCC Act (2010) 
 The Minister shall ―oversee the performance of the Authority and make annual reports to 
Parliament‖ Section 79 (1) (e) of the KCC Act (2010)  
 The Minister shall have general powers to give directives on policy and general development 
of the Capital City and the Authority shall comply with the directives Section 79 (2) of the 
KCC Act (2010) 
41 
 
Figure 3: The KCCA Matrix Agency Structure 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s creation based on the KCC Act (2010) and Primary data 
 
In reference to Figure 3 above, it is clearly evident that the bureaucrats headed by the Executive 
Director report to three power centers; the Authority, Parliament and to the Minister for Kampala 
Affairs while the Authority headed by the Lord Mayor reports to two power centers; Parliament 
and to the Minister for Kampala Affairs. This intricate agency structure as earlier noted has 
created contradictions that are responsible for not only intra-power contestations between the 
political and technical wing, but also between the political wing and the Minister for Kampala 
Affairs.  
 
In 2012, the KCCA Lord Mayor was ‗impeached‘ by the councilors on allegations of abuse of 
office and failure to call Authority meetings. However the legal framework establishing the 
agency is inherently flawed in as far as it distributes power and authority across the three main 
actors. One key informant from the political wing had this to say;  
 
The Lord Mayor has tried to exercise his mandate as stated in section 11 (e) but as you know, 
this act started to be implemented in 2010/2011 and being something new, and the implementers 
of the law were also new both from the political and technical wing, somehow somewhere, there 
was misinterpretation of the law which resulted into clashes. 
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The assertion that the powers given to the Lord Mayor are the same as the powers given to the 
Executive Director was affirmed by another key informant from the ruling party. The challenge 
with the KCCA agency structure is the lack of financial but most importantly policy 
accountability to the political wing. Having several reporting power centres implies that 
bureaucrats pay more accountability allegiance to the central government which is the appointing 
arm, and less to the political wing that is vested neither with appointing powers nor the ability to 
sanction the bureaucrats for their actions or inaction.    
c) The Limited Role of Elected Leaders in the Decision-Making Process  
Despite clear provisions in the KCCA Act, 2010 that mainstream the role of elected leaders in 
the policy-making process, the powers vested on to the Minister to veto and rescind policy 
decisions of the agency imply a deliberate government move to push the elected leaders in the 
agency to the periphery of policy making.  The primary data analysed has evidently shown that 
policy-making in the agency is not undertaken in practice as it is written in the law. When 
confronted with the question of the extent to which the Authority is able to hold the Executive 
Director for her actions or inaction, one key informant from the Authority candidly replied;  
Can you hold someone responsible when you don’t appoint him/her? There is a time when the 
authority concluded that the Executive Director was high high-handed in implementing certain 
policies, and the Authority wanted to have her removed from office. We (political leaders) looked 
at the provisions of the law and we do not have that mandate as the Authority. It’s only the 
appointing authority, in this case the president, who can remove the Executive Director. 
Within the confines of KCCA as an agency, administered and managed for and on behalf of the 
central government, the evidence suggests that it is a deliberate ploy to have the agency firmly in 
the hands of the central government without any due political interference from locally elected 
political leaders. Confronted with the question of the centrality of elected leaders in decision-
making within the agency, a key informant from government firmly echoed that;  
According to the constitution (Article 1), power belongs to the people; but the people shall 
exercise their powers in accordance with the Constitution; Article 98 says that there shall be a 
president who shall be vested with executive authority and indeed as an agency under the direct 
control of government; the people in Kampala have ceded their authority to the President.  
 
5.4. The Public Decision-making Process in the Agency 
 
In a traditional executive agency, the bureaucrats are expected to implement the policies set forth 
by the parent ministry while the minister, as a political actor plays an oversight role to ensure 
that the agency is realising its policy objectives. Executive agencies are expected to operate 
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under NPM principles that emphasize quantity, quality and efficiency in service delivery.  Under 
the KCCA agency, it‘s clear that the bureaucracy headed by the Executive Director has 
managerial autonomy majorly with regards to policy implementation but also to some extent 
policy-making. This reality has lessened political control but at the same time resulted in a 
reduced role of elected politicians in matters of policy-making and review. As earlier noted, 
elected leaders can advise, guide and direct the agency bureau on matters of policy, but have no 
mandate to sanction the managers for their actions or inactions across the policy cycle.  
In essence the central government takeover of the administration and management of Kampala 
city is part of government‘s earlier recentralisation efforts aimed at weakening the 
decentralisation policy that vested significant power and authority in the hands of elected leaders.  
The managers in the KCCA agency have become ‗street-level‘ front-line workers who 
significantly influence the delivery of public services in the city; they determine which 
programmes should be designed and who is eligible; they allocate resources through the budget 
process; they enforce compliance and impose sanctions and have mandate to exempt individuals 
and businesses from taxes. ―Given their position at the interface of the state and the citizens, and 
their opportunities to exercise discretion, front-line managers exert influence well beyond their 
formal authority‖ (Meyers & Vorsanger, 2007, p. 154). The opportunity to interface with the 
citizens and to operate with a level of discretion, the agency managers have technically pushed 
the political actors to the periphery of policy making which in principle involves the rationalised 
allocation of scarce resources. In Michael Lipsky‘s (1980) description as quoted in Meyers & 
Vorsanger, (2007, p. 154), agency managers ―…not only deliver but actively shape policy 
outcomes by interpreting rules and allocating scarce resource‖ 
Bureaucrats managing KCCA affairs to a great extent not only play a policy implementation 
function, but equally influence the shape of policy as a consequence of their discretionary 
powers enshrined in the KCCA Act, 2010.  It‘s a reality supported by the intent of the 
agencification process, which underscored the need to have the city firmly in the hands of the 
central government.   
5.5. Public Decision-Making debate in the Literature and Theoretical 
Frameworks  
 
To empirically review public decision-making in KCCA, it‘s imperative that a review of the 
KCCA agency model in relation to the concept of agencification is undertaken. In this sub 
section, the study makes a conclusive analysis of the points of tangency and deviation of the 
KCCA agency model from the broad agencification debate. The point of analysis begins from 
what scholars of agencification have used as cross-cutting features to broadly designate what an 
executive agency is. The section then explores the concept of decision-making in the agency in 
light of the theoretical frames applied.  
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5.5.1. Agencification of KCC in the light of the Literature Reviewed 
 
Pollit, Bathgate, Caulfield, Smullen, and Talbot, (2001) in their seminal article Agency fever? 
Analysis of an international policy fashion, offered five distinct characteristics that delineate an 
executive agency. The illustration below presents an analysis of the extent to which the KCCA 
agency model meets or deviates from the characteristics.  
Table 6: An analysis of the KCCA agency model  
SN Characteristics The extent to which KCCA meets the 
characteristic 
I.  They are at arm's length from the 
main hierarchical spines of ministries  
KCCA is structurally disaggregated from the 
parent ministry but has been firmly placed under 
the Ministry for Kampala Affairs. It‘s therefore 
not structurally disaggregated  
II.  Executive agencies carry out public 
tasks (service provision, regulation, 
adjudication, and certification) at a 
national level 
KCCA is mandated to deliver public services in 
Kampala city  
 
III.  Their core staff are public servants 
(not necessarily civil servants—
definitions here again vary 
enormously between countries) 
 
All KCCA staffs are classified as public 
servants. The Executive Director heads the 
agency    
IV.  They are financed, in principle at 
least, by the state budget. In practice, 
some agencies recover a good deal of 
their financial needs from charges 
―67 % of KCCA budget for the Financial Year 
2016/2017‖ (Ministry of Kampala Affairs, 2016, 
p. 8) is government financing and the rest comes 
from locally generated revenue 
V.  They are subject to at least some 
administrative law procedures (i.e., 
they are not wholly or predominantly 
private law bodies 
The KCCA agency is established by the KCCA 
Act, 2010 and also adheres to the Local 
Government Act (1997) 
Source: Pollit, C., Bathgate, K., Caulfield, J., Smullen, A., & Talbot, C. (2001) 
Table 6, therefore illustrates that the KCCA agency model generally adheres to the main 
principles defining an executive agency with two specific exceptions. First is that the agency has 
its own ministry as opposed to the traditional concept where an executive agency will fall under 
the parent ministry; second is that the KCCA Act, 2010 maintains some principles of local 
governments by providing for a locally elected leadership. The structural differences of the 
KCCA agency augurs well with Yesilkagit's (2004, p. 119) view, who asserts that ―across 
countries, and even sometimes within individual countries, agencies vary so much in terms of 
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their powers and statuses that it‘s hard to think of many generalizations that could possibly fit 
every member of the species.‖  
Scholarly literature has aggregated the above characteristics into three distinct variants 
delineated by Fjeldstad (2009) as quoted in Sulle (2010, p. 346 as the ‗tripod model‘. The three 
variants are structural disaggregation, managerial autonomy and contractualisation. Indeed, the 
KCCA agency is structurally disaggregated but with a unique edifice unseen across the countries 
that have agencified.   A traditional executive agency has a bureaucracy reporting to the parent 
minister as seen in the UK Next program agencies or to a permanent secretary as evident in 
Tanzania (see Sulle, 2010).  
In contrast, the KCCA model has multiple reporting structures with the bureaucracy reporting to 
the Authority (Lord Mayor and elected councillors), Parliament and the Minister for Kampala 
Affairs. The agency is managed by a team of bureaucrats headed by the Executive Director with 
significant managerial autonomy to undertake their mandates. All agency staffs are employed on 
five-year renewable contracts.   
In summary, the multiple reporting and accountability structures imply that KCCA is an 
executive agency not ‗at arm‘s length‘ from the line ministry. However the agency clearly 
adheres to the other features of an executive agency including: having a mandate to deliver 
services to city dwellers; having a fully functioning set of bureaucrats (public servants); being 
funded to a great extent from the national budget; and operating under a defined legal framework 
(KCC Act, 2010). These distinct features are in conformity with what scholarly literature adduce 
as features that define an executive agency (see Pollit et. al., 2001; Caulfield, 2002; Pollitt, 2003; 
(Caulfield, 2002a; Egeberg & Trondal, 2009; Pollit et al., 2001a; Pollitt, 2003; Wettenhall, 2005; 
Egeberg & Trondal, 2009).  
Indeed a review of the primary data further indicated that the agency is implementing its 
mandate in application of new public management doctrines but it was beyond the scope of this 
study to ascertain the quality of policy outcomes in the period the agency has existed.  
5.5.2. Public Decision-Making in the Light of the Theoretical Framework 
 
The theoretical framework for this study is the institutionalism theory, which has been applied to 
enable an empirical analysis of the behaviour of political and bureaucratic actors using temporal 
dimensions and policy outcomes. The study specifically applied two strands; the historical and 
Rational choice institutionalism to enable the researcher come to logical conclusion about public 
decision-making in the institution as a result of both dependant and independent variables. The 
institutionalism theory was therefore chosen because of its capability to coherently illuminate the 
emergence of institutions and their effects on policy formulation.  
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Evidence from key informants and documents reviewed, indicates that the reasons behind the 
agencification of KCC were a combination of historical factors ranging from the failures of 
decentralisation, poor service delivery, on-going civil service reform programmes and central-
local government political relations. According to  Gore & Muwanga, (2013, p. 6), ‗‗the reforms 
leading to the agencification of KCC can be traced back to poor service delivery and historic 
tensions between multiple interests deeply involved in its governance‘‘. According to the World 
Bank, (2014, p. 43); 
―In 2010, Kampala City was in desperate need of repair. Many city roads were riddled with 
potholes, most of the street lights were not working, and local government corruption interfered 
with the resources necessary to improve the city‘s infrastructure and delivery of services to its 
citizens.‖ 
The central government‘s relations with key political actors, particularly the elected leaders, 
were generally not good for the development of the city. Kampala as a district continued to 
receive inadequate central government funding which could not adequately fund quality service 
delivery. In 2010, just one year to the agencification of KCC, ―the central government allocated 
UGX: 41 billion to KCC, yet the city required a minimum of UGX: 210 billion‖ (Ministry of 
Kampala Affairs, 2016, p. 15) to effectively delivery its mandate.  
Anecdotal information reveals that the failure by NRM party-leaning candidates to win mayoral 
elections since the coming into force of the decentralisation policy partly led to a legal takeover 
of the administration and management of the city. Several government and media reports 
emphasize a history of poor service delivery, corruption and mismanagement in several urban 
centres as well as government‘s continued civil service reform programmes initiated in the late 
1980s as the main reasons. In 2005, government amended the Local Governments Act (1997) 
and stripped local councils (including Kampala) of the authority to hire or fire Chief 
Administrative Officers‖ (Karyeija & Kyohairwe, 2012, p. 44), consequently limiting local 
political control and granting more job security to district chief accounting officers. Further to 
this, and considered to be the turning point was a constitutional amendment in 2005, that 
declared Kampala as the capital city of Uganda, to be administered by the central government.  
In reality, several historical factors with the constitutional amendment in 2005 as a critical 
juncture are responsible for the legal takeover and establishment of KCCA in 2010. The 
managerial autonomy bestowed upon the bureaucrats to implement policies for the betterment of 
the city can be viewed as path dependant but with unintended consequences, one of which is a 
limited role of elected leaders in the decision-making processes in the agency.  
However, the agencification of KCC cannot only be illuminated in historical perspectives; 
According to Gore & Muwanga, (2013, p. 3) ―the national government‘s takeover of Kampala 
was a well-planned effort to reclaim a powerful economic and political space that had been out 
of its reach since coming to power in 1986‖. Critical economic considerations were at play with 
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Kampala currently Uganda‘s largest urban conglomeration accounting for an ―estimated 80 
percent of the country‘s industrial sector and generating 50 percent of the GDP‖ (World Bank, 
2014, p. 43). Further to the above, the takeover of Kampala would shield the ruling NRM ―from 
political fallout associated with public dissatisfaction and even anger with poor living conditions 
in the city‖ (Karyeija & Kyohairwe, 2012, p. 40). In light of its economic potential, Kampala if 
well-organised and well-governed, would potentially increase government‘s domestic revenues 
and raise funds to finance its development programmes.   
The city‘s overall budget for financial year 2016/2017 was UGX: 561 billion according to the 
Ministerial Policy Statement (Ministry of Kampala Affairs, 2016). This funding is 7 times more 
than what was being availed to KCC as a local government unit. The agency has increased its 
domestic revenues from a UGX: 25 billion in 2011 to now over UGX: 87 billion in 2015/2016. 
The increase in funding is positively correlated with increase in the quality and quality of 
services being delivered. The agency is now professionally managed and has initiated new public 
management doctrines with an increasing focus on the consumers of its services. In all these 
undertakings, the agency bureaucrats continue to occupy an important space previously occupied 
by elected leaders. The World Bank that is funding the agency to the tune of UGX: 280 billion 
for various institutional and infrastructural projects commented on its current policy outcomes as 
follows;  
KCCA management has taken steps towards enhancing the culture of transparency and due 
process in the administration and governance within the city. As such, KCCA has established a 
formal public consultation process. It holds annual budget conferences for all its stakeholders, 
has also revamped its website and is on Facebook and twitter social media. It has also charted out 
a transformative vision for the city which outlines a medium term plan for addressing the 
challenges outlined before (World Bank, 2014, p. 5). 
In summary, an analysis of the agencification of KCC and in particular the public decision-
making processes through the historical institutionalism lens has illuminated that the 
transformation of KCC into an agency was path dependant in light of previous temporal 
processes. Consequently there have been several unintended consequences with public decision-
making clearly undermined.  The rationality of the decision to establish an executive agency has 
seen an increased allocation of government funding to the agency to enable it increase the sum of 
services delivered and address historical maladministration and mismanagement. The 
professionalism exhibited by agency bureaucrats with new public management doctrines at play 
has meant that the void that would have been created by limited public decision-making is not 
visible.  
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5.5.3. Conclusion 
 
The KCCA agency structures directly enables the central government to direct, design and 
deliver policy outcomes, a scenario that replaces a long tradition of decentralised local service 
delivery where locally elected officials were policy makers. Despite the maintenance of local 
government principles, and in particular having an elected Authority, the policy practices are 
different from the provisions of the law and subsequently this has limited the policy influence of 
elected leaders in the policy-making processes.  
In instances where the Authority is mandated to design policies, the power of the minister to 
rescind and veto Authority decisions undermines the policy decisions of locally elected leaders 
and reinforces the overwhelming centrality of government in all affairs of the agency. The 
agency managers have a lot of discretionary powers such as levying and exempting taxes as well 
as design and delivery of policy and development programmes. This has enabled the agency 
managers to have regular interfaces with the consumers, technically assuming a vital citizen-state 
linkage, hitherto held by political actors.   
Public decision-making through directly elected local leaders remains on the periphery and this 
scenario is unlikely to change. Government has consistently argued that KCCA is an executive 
agency directly administered by the central government and under Article 5 of the Constitution; 
the people have ceded their mandate to the President. This reality challenges the notion of 
representative democracy and public decision-making in an executive agency keen on NPM 
principles.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the conclusions and policy recommendations in the light of the findings of 
the study. The sub-section further highlights areas for further research.  
6.2. Future Public Decision-Making Studies 
 
There are actually no previous scholarly studies on public decision-making in executive agencies 
with specific reference to sub Saharan Africa, by virtue of the fact that executive agencies are 
traditionally designed as public departmental bodies created to deliver specific public services 
within a ministry. The KCCA agency model that is structurally disaggregated with several 
reporting and accountability power centres is a new phenomenon that challenges current literary 
work on the concept of agencification. With the bureaucrats given an increasingly high stake in 
influencing policy outcomes within the agency, future public decision-making studies within an 
agency should focus on ‗what new approaches‘ can be applied to increase citizen and citizen 
groups roles in engaging as well as influencing policy outcomes in an agency like KCCA.  
 
6.3. Conclusion  
 
The purpose of this study was four fold; first was to comment and generate literature on the 
agencification phenomena in emerging economies with a focus on Uganda and a minimal 
comparative review of the agency model in Tanzania. The second was to apply the 
chronological, contextual and institutional arrangements of the new agency model (KCCA) into 
the theoretical framework of historical and Rational choice institutionalism. The third was to 
undertake a focused interrogation, analysis and logical conclusion regarding public decision 
making, accountability mechanisms and the extent to which elected leaders play central roles in 
influencing the decisions that emerge from executive agencies with dualistic reporting structures. 
The fourth and most important was to provide logical solutions to the agency problem. 
 
This study has shown that the agencification of KCC was a symbolic move by the ruling NRM 
party to recentralise the administration and management of Kampala. The creation of an 
executive agency with strong managerial autonomy bequeathed to the bureaucrats has ensured 
government‘s firm grip on the city‘s policy outcomes, and technically relegated locally elected 
leaders to the periphery of the policy process. Despite multiple reporting and accountability 
centres, the president‘s role in appointing and dismissing the top managers of the agency 
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provides him with a significant influence over the policy affairs of the agency and in essence, 
directly limits the policy influence of elected leaders in Kampala city.  
The Rational for government takeover of the administration and management of the city  varies  
but can broadly be categorised as emanating from a history of local-central government political 
contestations regarding the deteriorating state of service delivery in the city, evidenced by; a lack 
of order, auto congestion, unplanned infrastructure developments and failure to collect garbage 
among others. Kampala is not only the administrative capital but also the commercial hub of the 
country and any future economic growth plan must take into consideration the capability of the 
city to play a central co-ordinating and facilitating role. This economic consideration was 
strongly adduced, by literature reviewed and key informants, as necessary for the ruling NRM 
party to not only protect its financial interests but also cushion itself from potential unrest that 
may erupt due to dissatisfaction of service delivery.   
With regard to public decision-making, this study has empirically shown that the creation of 
multiple reporting and accountability centres was a figurative move intended to hoodwink 
elected leaders with superficial status and authority but in essence no real power to demand for 
policy changes, let alone be able to sanction bureaucrats for their actions or inactions. The study 
questions the intent to agencify KCC while at the same time maintaining some tennets of local 
governance, yet the policy position and role of elected leaders had been clearly diluted by the 
law establishing the agency.  
KCCA‘s agency challenges therefore spring from the very legal framework that establishes it. 
The law presents a clash of roles and responsibilities among the three main actors; the Authority 
represented by the Lord Mayor and councillors; the Executive Director who heads the bureau 
and the Minister for Kampala Affairs. The Authority has mandate to develop programmes and 
strategies for the development of the city, but these programmes/strategies can be rescinded and 
vetoed by the minister. This directly affects public decision-making because the authority is 
deemed to engage in the policy processes with the mandate of the people. The clash of roles is 
further exemplified in what is termed a matrix organisational structure with several reporting and 
accountability centres.  
This study has therefore shown that agencification processes are varied both in form and intent. 
While as there are incidences of declining old public management and a desire to reposition 
governments to deliver more services with less, it‘s still an important concern for governments to 
create agencies with managerial autonomy over policy implementation but with less influence 
over the policy making function. The KCCA model has shown that agencification as one of the 
NPM approaches has increased institutional and policy complexities that alienate citizens and 
citizen groups from the decision-making process. This reality challenges the existing literature 
on agencification and NPM that once we structurally disaggregate and create semi-independent 
agencies, then we see bureaucrats who are more accountable to citizens.   
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6.4. Policy Recommendations 
 
On the whole, the majority of key respondents pointed to the need to amend the legislation to 
ensure that there is clarity of roles and a single-spine administrative hierarchy. However, it‘s 
important to note that any amendment to the legislation only becomes effective in the next 
elective term of office and even then, how can a revised administrative structure provide for a 
strong body of elected leaders able to influence policy processes in the agency?  
The design of the agency, and in particular the power of the bureaucrats and the Minister over 
the policy processes within the agency, has been predetermined and is path dependant. It‘s a well 
calculated move by the central government to reduce the influence of elected leaders in the city‘s 
policy processes and thus the possibility for a review of the legal framework to change the status 
quo is unlikely at least under the current political leadership. It‘s therefore proposed that; 
a) The matrix agency structure is reviewed and restructured so that all elected leaders constitute 
a Ministerial Advisory Panel (MAB) whose mandate will be to advise the minister on matters 
of policy related to the agency 
b) To strengthen the voice of citizens and indeed increase public decision-making, the agency 
managers should explore new organisational dynamics including the use of NPM doctrines 
that put the consumer first. In this way, the agency will be able to directly provide for public 
decision-making and enable citizens‘ influence over agency policy outcomes without 
necessarily relying on elected leaders  
c) The structure of the Ministry for Kampala Affairs should be reviewed and instead have the 
agency fall under the existing Ministry for Housing and Urban Development to lessen inter-
governmental duplication of efforts and services. Having an independent ministry for 
Kampala is a wastage of public resources especially because the agency is semi-autonomous 
in implementing its strategies and programmes, and the law provides for the Executive 
Director to report to Parliament in execution of his/her duties 
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Appendix 1: Interview Consistency Matrix (Guide) 
 
Research Field questions Related concept 
What are some of the historical factors responsible for 
Government takeover of the administration and 
management of Kampala Capital City? 
Understanding the agencification 
through historical 
institutionalism  
Do you think the current shape and structure of the 
agency as well as current public policies were 
predetermined by some actors 
Understanding the agencification 
through rationale choice 
institutionalism  
There are many actors both within and without that 
influence the decisions made by the agency. Which ones 
do you know? 
Influential actors in the realm of 
public decision-making 
To what extent does the authority (elected leaders) 
influence public policy processes in the agency (please 
give some examples) 
Public decision-making 
To what extent do bureaucrats in KCCA influence public 
policy processes in the agency 
Public decision-making 
Section 11 (e) of the KCCA Act, states that the  Lord 
Mayor shall head the authority in developing strategies 
and programmes for the development of the capital city; 
do you think the Lord Mayor and indeed the authority has 
exercised this mandate?  
Yes …………..How………………… 
No…………….why……………………… 
Probing further the extent and 
depth of public decision-making 
by the elected officials as 
representatives of the citizenry 
Has the transformation from KCC to KCCA enhanced 
accountability between the different actors?  
No… 
Yes….if yes how 
Quality of public decisions 
emerging from the agency 
Has the transformation from KCC to KCCA improved 
service delivery in the city?  
Quality of public decisions 
emerging from the agency 
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No… 
Yes….if yes how 
The KCCA Act Section 17 (1) provides for the Executive 
Director as the chief executive of the Authority appointed 
by the President and reporting both to the Authority and 
to the Minister for Kampala. Is the authority able to hold 
the ED for the actions or inactions of the authority?  
Yes ……………how………………….. 
No…………….why…………………… 
Understanding the extent of 
control by the political actors and 
its effects on policy decisions 
emanating from the agency   
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